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PUBLIC ACCESS TO COASTAL PUBLIC
PROPERTY: JUDICIAL THEORIES
AND THE TAKING ISSUE
GILBERT

L.

FINNELL, JR.t

To perfect public rights of access in private coastal lands, courts
apply the common-law doctrinesofprescription,dedication, custom, and
the public trust. Once these rights are perfected, the public may protect
its interest in private lands under the doctrinesof nuisance andpurpresture, the public trust, and migrating easements, as well as other remedies normally availableto private landowners. The scope of thesepublic
rights has important implications for fifth amendment takings challenges: regulationsdesigned to protectpreexistingpublic rightsin private
property will not constitute a taking.
Professor Finnell traces the evolution of these common-law doctrinesfor perfecting public access rights and identifies the factors that
courts consider in analyzing fifth amendment takings challenges. He
then evaluates the effectiveness of the different doctrines in procuring
andprotectingpublic rightsin coastallands. He concludes thatthe public trust doctrine should become the principaltheoreticalfoundation for
assuring reasonablepublic access to public property and for protecting
public rights already established under other common-law doctrines,
and should be a principalfactorfor courts to weigh when applying the
multifactoredfifth amendment takings analysis. Finally,ProfessorFinnell arguesfor a presumption of constitutionalityand a deferentiallevel
ofjudicial review.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Private property rights often conflict with public property rights where the
land meets the sea. To protect public interests in tidal and submerged lands,
courts apply the public trust doctrine, the federal navigational servitude, and a
host of other judicial theories. The public trust doctrine provides that tidal and
submerged lands seaward of the mean high tide line are held in trust for the
public for navigation, fishing, and other public uses; I the federal navigational
servitude protects the public's important interest in the flow of interstate waters
by requiring courts to consider this interest in determining whether a fifth
t Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.B.A., J.D., Southern
Methodist University; LL.M., Harvard University; J.S.D., Columbia University. The author acknowledges the helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article from his colleagues, Professors
Sidney Buchanan, James Herget, and John Mixon; the invaluable research assistance from then
third-year law students P. Randall Crump, Mary G. Henderson, and Joe Tixier; and financial support from the University of Houston Law Foundation.
1. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 798-99 (1988); see infra notes 112-31
and accompanying text (discussing the public trust doctrine).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

amendment taking has occurred. 2
The Supreme Court has handed down several important public trust and
navigational servitude decisions during the last decade. The 1988 PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Mississippi3 decision reaffirms nineteenth-century Supreme Court
cases that gave expansive reach to the public trust doctrine. 4 As the Phillips
Court recognized, upon admission to the Union each state acquired title to "all
lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide," S and "the individual
States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and
to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit."'6 The public's equitable
interest can be terminated, however, as the 1984 case Summa Corp. v. California
ex rel. State Lands Commission 7 illustrates. The Summa Court held that
although California's Ballona wetlands were subject to the public trust doctrine
when California was admitted to the Union, the State's failure to present its
claim to a public trust easement in a federal patent proceeding barred subse8
quent enforcement of the public's equitable interest in the wetlands.
The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United States9 restricted the reach of the federal navigational servitude by holding that the servitude applies to "interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact
capable of supporting public navigation." 10 Waters made navigable because of
private investment are not subject to the federal navigational servitude. Kaiser
Aetna rejected the contention that the navigational servitude was coterminous
with federal regulatory power; the servitude was restricted to naturally navigable
waters.1" PhillipsPetroleum, in contrast, rejected the contention that the public
trust doctrine applies only to physically navigable waters; it reaffirmed states'
rights to define the public trust doctrine most expansively. 12 The combination
of KaiserAetna's restrictive view of the federal navigational servitude and Phillips Petroleum's expansive view of the public trust doctrine leaves states with
maximum power to protect the public's interest under the public trust
doctrine.13

This Article analyzes the judicial theories for establishing and preserving
public rights and assesses the implications of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence on public access, particularly in light of the public trust doctrine and fed2. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (navigational servitude did not
apply, and government's attempt to create public right of access amounted to a taking); infra notes
300-31 and accompanying text (discussing navigational servitude).
3. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
4. Kg., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S.
161 (1891).
5. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 795.
6. Id. at 794 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)).
7. 466 U.S. 198 (1984). For additional ways in which the public's equitable rights may be
terminated, see infra note 113.
8. Summa Corp., 466 U.S. at 209.
9. 444 U.S. 164 (1979); see infra notes 322-37 and accompanying text.
10. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
11. Id. at 171, 175.
12. PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 795-98.
13. See infra notes 371-88 and accompanying text.
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eral navigational servitude. The public rights analyzed in this Article have

important implications for fifth amendment takings challenges: 14 private title to
coastal land may already be burdened by preexisting public rights. If so, a regu-

lation designed to protect the public's preexisting rights will not constitute a
taking because it does not interfere with legitimate private expectations. The

Article argues for wide judicial recognition of public rights, and suggests ways
for courts to promote public access to public property.
Protecting and enhancing public access to public lands can be difficult.
Governments can acquire public accessways through negotiated purchase or em-

inent domain. 15 They can also require dedication of accessways, without compensation, as a condition to subdivision or other coastal development

permission. 16 Required dedications, though, require careful consideration of the
taking issue, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Nollan
17
v. California Coastal Commission.

The Court in Nollan held that the California Coastal Commission's requirement that the Nollans dedicate a lateral accessway prior to getting a coastal

development permit constituted a taking. The opinion, if narrowly interpreted,
ought not deter coastal governments and agencies from promoting public access

to public property through reasonable permit conditions, required dedications,
and fees in lieu thereof. It certainly should not undermine state open beaches
laws, such as those in Texas, 18 Oregon, 19 and the Virgin Islands, 20 which protect public property already acquired under various common-law doctrines.

Nollan's impact is strongly affected, though, by the Supreme Court's 1987
decision in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County of

Los Angeles. 21 FirstEnglish held that governments are liable for compensation

from the time of the taking when regulations amount to a taking.22 In combination, Nollan and FirstEnglish pose a significant threat to coastal public property.
Government regulators may be so chilled by the prospect of FirstEnglish tempo14. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
15. Cf. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkitf, 467 U.S. 229, 243-45 (1984) (liberally construing "public use" requirement of fifth amendment).
16. See generally Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3149-50 (1987)
(extensive citations of required dedication cases). But cf id. at 3141-50 (imposing the strict requirement that a governmental regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest).
17. 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987) (coastal commission could not make a building permit contingent on granting beach access without compensating the landowner). See generally Falik & Shimko,
The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View
from California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 376-97 (1988) (discussing California dedication law before
Nollan and the implications of Nollan); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The
New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 352-56 (1988) (discussing Nollan in relation
to other Supreme Court takings decisions); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101
HARV. L. REv. 119, 240-50 (1987) (reviewing takings jurisprudence, including Nollan) [hereinafter
Supreme Court, 1986 Term].
18. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.011-.025 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1988).
19. OR. Rnv. STAT. § 390.610 (1987).
20. Open Shorelines Act, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 401-03 (1982).
21. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); see Falik & Shimko, supra note 17,'at 359-76; The Supreme Cour
1986 Term, supra note 17, at 240-50.
22. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
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rary damages that, in their caution to guard the public purse, they may be less
than diligent in protecting public lands.
One of the Supreme Court's 1987 takings cases provides a note of optimism
for government regulators. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis23 strongly suggests that the Court will uphold stringent regulations against a
takings challenge if the purpose of the regulation is to prevent public harm.
Keystone also reaffirms recent Supreme Court cases which hold that the quantum of the landowner's property to which the diminution-in-value portion of the
takings analysis applies may be greater than the discrete parcel or interest that is
directly burdened. 24 Keystone does not offer direct support for public access
cases, and the public harm necessary to come within the "nuisance exception to
the taking guarantee" 25 is not always immediately apparent. Public nuisance
and purpresture law, 26 however, may justify application of Keystone's harm-pre27
vention policy, as may an innovative application of the public trust doctrine.
Further, Keystone is significant for public access law since a reasonable accessway requirement has a much better chance of passing constitutional muster,
because the quantum of property from which the diminution of value is computed will almost always be considerably greater than the discrete area in which
the public's easement is located.
The public can resort to several theories to support claims to use privately
owned "dry sands" 28 adjacent to the public's lands. Chief among these are dedication, prescription, custom, and the public trust doctrine, which are reviewed
in Part II of this Article. Public nuisance, purpresture, public trust, and other
remedies for protecting public rights are reviewed in Part III.
Even if the public has acquired rights under one of the available theories,
government officials may be indifferent to, or not know of, facts that could prove
the public's interest. Officials may be reluctant to assert the public's interest or
23. 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245 (1987) (Court noted state use of police power to "prevent impending
danger" does not require compensation).
24. Eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
25. Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the "nuisance exception ...is not coterminous with
the police power itself" and in Justice Rehnquist's view, New York's landmark preservation law did
not come within the nuisance exception).
26. See infra notes 150-83 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 112-31 and accompanying text.
28. In State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969), for example, the drysand area was defined as the land lying between the line of mean high tide and the visible line of
vegetation. Id. at 586, 462 P.2d at 672-73. Since this area is affected by some tidal action, "dry" is
something of a misnomer, especially when storms cause unusually high tides. See infra notes 252-62
and accompanying text. See generally D. BROWER, ACCESS TO THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL
AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES (1978) (discussing public use legal theories and planning strategies);
D. DUCSIK, SHORELINE FOR THE PUBLIC (1974) (discussing social and economic dimensions and
legal aspects); NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN BEACH ACCESS

(1977) (extensive review of various states' access laws); Wilson, Private Property and the Public
Trust: A Theoryfor Preservingthe CoastalZone, 4 UCLA J.ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 57 (1984) (arguing
for the public trust doctrine as principal base for public access); Comment, Public Beach Access
Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrineto Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. REV.1049,
1069-86 (1981) (urging public trust doctrine as proper doctrinal foundation for beach exactions);
Comment, Public Access to Receding Beaches, 13 Hous. L. REV. 984 (1976) (discussing Texas law
and making case for "rolling easement"); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564
(1970) (comparing public use doctrines and easements through regulation).
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to accept management responsibility. Phillips Petroleum provides some protection from lax public management by reaffirming the principle that equitable doc-

trines such as laches or equitable estoppel will rarely bar the public's property
29
rights.

II.

A.

COMMON-LAW DOCTRINES FOR PERFECTING PUBLIC RIGHTS IN
PRIVATE COASTAL LANDS

Prescription

The elements of a prescriptive easement are similar to those required to
acquire title by adverse possession. The claimant must prove actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse use, under claim of right, for the prescribed period.3 0
When argued in a supportive jurisdiction, the public prescription theory
29. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 799 (state law controls, and Supreme Court refused to
apply equitable considerations when Mississippi law ruled them inapplicable).
30. Eg., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 1974) (citing
Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 64 (Fla. 1958)); Hunt Land Holding Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d
697, 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe, 347 Mass. 760, 761, 200 N.E.2d 282,
283 (1964).
Although prescription continues to be an important theory for establishing public rights in dry
beaches, it has several conceptual and practical shortcomings. The "lost grant" theory, although
increasingly less important, still causes confusion. See State ex rel Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,
145, 594 P.2d 1093, 1098 (1979) (claim of right and long possession yield presumption of a grant to
claimant which has been lost over time). See generally C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE
524-26 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing history of fiction of lost grant, showing the sharp differences between that theory and modem prescription theory).
Permissive public use defeats prescription, and this is easily proved in some courts because of a
presumption of permissive use of beach accessways. See Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 116
N.J. Super. 148, 158, 281 A.2d 377, 382 (1971) ("[Where land is in a general state of nature and left
unimproved by its owner, sporadic or even customary use of such property by a mere user is presumably permissive if there has been no actual deprivation of any beneficial use to the owner."); Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 580, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1974) ("[W]e moved from the majority view
that the user is presumed to be permissive; and the permissive presumption rule has been followed in
this jurisdiction ever since."). In part, because of North Carolina's permissive presumption rule, one
commentator concluded that because "[e]stablishing an easement by prescription ... is burdensome,
uncertain, and not judicially favored in North Carolina... this Comment does not recommend it as
a judicial tool for establishing beach access in North Carolina." Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access to North CarolinaBeaches, 64 N.C.L. REv. 159, 168 (1985).
Some jurisdictions refuse to allow the public, as contrasted with an individual claimant, to
perfect an easement by prescription. See, eg., Ivons-Nispel, 347 Mass. at 761-62, 200 N.E.2d at 283
(holding that one individual met all the state's requirements for a prescriptive easement, but "'persons of the local community' and the 'general public' are too broad a group to acquire by prescription an easement to use private beaches for bathing and for recreational purposes"). The Supreme
Court of Idaho reached a similar conclusion in Haman, 100 Idaho at 145, 594 P.2d at 1098. An
action was brought to perfect the public's rights in privately owned lake front property. The court
first upheld the lower court's finding that the public use was permissive and thus did not meet the
requirement of adverse use. Id. at 144, 594 P.2d at 1097. In order to avoid reaching another contention of the prescriptive claimants, the court held, "'people of the State of Idaho' as distinguished
from specific individuals cannot acquire prescriptive rights in and to private property absent some
express statutory authority." Id. at 146, 594 P.2d at 1099. The court noted that it had "long ago
abandoned the fiction of the lost grant," a theory which underlay some courts' refusal to allow
prescriptive rights in the general public. Id. at 145, 594 P.2d at 1098. Nevertheless, the court refused to recognize the public's rights.
The rights contended for here are in the nature of an easement in gross. Being a personal
right, the rule is that one individual's prescriptive use cannot inure to the benefit of anyone
else. Personal prescriptive rights are confined to the actual adverse user and are limited to
the use exercised during the prescriptive period.
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can be quite effective. Moody v. White,31 a suit to protect the public's rights
under the Texas Open Beaches Act, is illustrative. The landowner had constructed a motel on land that was alleged to be public property acquired by
easement, dedication, and custom. 32 Extensive testimony was taken from fishermen, ferryboat captains, law enforcement officials, long-time residents, and
others. The court concluded that:
[t]he public's use of the beach for many years was so open, visible and
notorious that the appellants must have recognized the people's right
to the beach. For many years in excess of the 10 year statutory period,
the general public used the beach as their own: hunting, fishing, swimuing, boating, sunning, and effecting many more uses. 33
Although the court noted that in some jurisdictions the unorganized public
is incapable of acquiring land by prescription, Moody concluded that in Texas
the general public "may acquire beaches by prescription if it can be established
that the public has met all the requirements for adverse possession." 34 The
court therefore upheld the lower court injunction requiring removal of the
35
motel.
Permissive use can defeat an alleged prescriptive easement in the public, as
City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc. 36 illustrates. Defendant landowner
had owned waterfront property in Daytona Beach for more than sixty-five years.
He received a city license to construct a sky tower on the dry sand portion of the
beach above the mean high tide line. Plaintiff, a nearby observation tower operator, protested the issuance of the permit, alleging that the public had acquired
an exclusive prescriptive right to the use of defendant's land. The court denied
the easement, noting that "[i]f the use of an alleged easement is not exclusive and
not inconsistent with the rights of the owner of the land to its use and enjoyment, it [is] presumed that such use is permissive rather than adverse." 37 Then,
tracing the historical uses of the area around the sky tower, the court found that
"[tihe use of the property by the public was not against, but was in furtherance
38
of, the interest of the defendant owner."1
Id. at 146, 594 P.2d at 1099.
Even when courts recognize the theory, claimants may need to bring a separate lawsuit for each
parcel in which they assert an easement. Cf State ex reL Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 594, 462
P.2d 671, 676-77 (1969) (explaining why prescription's need for individual lawsuits makes it less
desirable than custom).
31. 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
32. Id. at 374.
33. Id. at 377-78.
34. Id. at 378.
35. Id. at 380.
36. 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
37. Id. at 76.
38. Id at 77. In dictum the court explained that even if it had found an easement in the public,
the defendant-owner could make any use of the land consistent with, or not calculated to
interfere with, the exercise of the easement by the public ....The erection of the sky tower
was consistent with the recreational use of the land by the public and could not interfere
with the exercise of any easement the public may have acquired by prescription, if such
were the case.
Id. (citation omitted).
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B. Dedication-Expressand Implied
A landowner can expressly dedicate lands to public use, and the transfer to
the public is complete upon acceptance by the public. 3 9 Implied dedications are
also possible. 4° If a landowner's acts and conduct manifest an intent to dedicate
land to the public, acts by the public in reliance thereon may constitute acceptance and complete the transfer of public rights. 4 1 Determining whether there
was an intent to dedicate is the most troublesome problem in dedication law, as
the following cases illustrate.
Seaway Co. v. Attorney General42 involved implied dedication. Texas' open
beaches law creates a prima facie presumption that the public has acquired an
interest in the portion of the beach lying between the low high tide line and the
seaward side of the vegetation line by prescription, implied dedication, or custom and cannot be excluded from using the area for ingress and egress to the
sea. 43 The Act authorizes the Attorney General of Texas and certain other officials to enforce its provisions. 44
Extensive evidence in Seaway proved that the public had regularly used the
West Galveston beach in question for at least as long as anyone could remember,
and that no one had ever considered it necessary to ask for permission to use the
beach.4 5 Only for a short time near the beginning of the century had any of the
beach been fenced; even then, the gates were easily opened and people continued
to traverse the beach. Galveston County had routinely maintained the beach,
spending $82,000 from 1929 to the date of trial.
The Attorney General and others sued to force removal of barriers that
reached from the line of vegetation seaward beyond the mean high tide line and
to enjoin future erections seaward of the vegetation line. 46 The court held that
the public had earlier perfected easements by implied dedication and prescription to "the area seaward from the seaward side of the line of vegetation to the
line of mean high tide." 47 Seaway's requirements for implied dedication were
summarized in Villa Nova Resort, Inc v. State :48
(1) the landowner induced the belief that he intended to dedicate the
area in question to public use; (2) the landowner was competent to do
so, i.e., had fee simple title; (3) the public relied on the acts of the
39. See Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Tex.Civ. App. 1979) ("Generally an express
dedication is accomplished by deed or a written document"; acceptance problems may arise when it
does not.).
40. See id.; Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986) ("Intent to dedicate may be implied by the grantor's conduct, open acts, or the surrounding
circumstances.").
41. See Villa Nova, 711 S.W.2d at 128. But see Comment, supra note 30, at 171 (concluding on
the authority of North Carolina cases involving streets and highways that "public user alone" is
probably not sufficient evidence of acceptance).
42. 375 S.W.2d 923 (rex. Civ. App. 1964) (writ ref'd n.r.e.).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See TEx. NAT. Ras. CoDE ANN. §§ 61.011-.025 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1988).
Id. § 61.018.
375 .W.2d at 931-35.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 935.
711 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986).
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landowner and will be served by the dedication;
and, (4) there was an
49
offer and acceptance of the dedication.
The Seaway court emphasized that, although the landowner generally manifests
an intent to transfer to public use in an implied dedication, the requisite intent
50
need not be express.
The California Supreme Court enunciated its theories of implied dedication
in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King.5 1 Acknowledging its earlier

recognition of implied dedication in cases involving roadways, the Gion court
admitted that it had "in the past been less receptive to arguments of implied
dedication when open beach lands were involved" because of the undefined
boundaries of those lands.5 2 The court then noted that "beach areas are now as
well-defined as roadways," 53 and, relying on Seaway and other cases, concluded
' 4
"that there was an implied dedication of property rights in both cases."
In California, a common-law dedication of property to the public can be

proved "either by showing acquiescence of the owner in use of the land under
circumstances that negate the idea that the use is under a license or by establishing open and continuous use by the public for the prescriptive period." 5 5 The

claimant must prove the owner's actual consent to the dedication if asserting
dedication by acquiescence for a period of less than five years.5 6 The owner's
intent in this case "is the crucial factor."' 57 If the claimant seeks to prove dedication by adverse use, however,

inquiry shifts from the intent and activities of the owner to those of the
public. The question then is whether the public has used the land "for
a period of more than five years with full knowledge of the owner,

without asking or receiving
permission to do so and without objection
'5 8
being made by any one."

The Gion court rejected the landowner's argument that extended public use
should be presumed to be under a license from the landowner.5 9 Instead, the
49. Id. at 128. Seaway's theoretical rationale for implied dedication sounds both in gift law
(offer to dedicate and acceptance) and equitable estoppel: "where others act on the faith of such
dedication, the landowner will be estopped to deny the dedication, or make any future use of the
property inconsistent with any purpose for which the land was dedicated." Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at
936.
50. Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 936 ("The intent on the part of the owner, however, is not a secret
intent, but is that expressed by visible conduct and open acts of the owner.").
51. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (state supreme court consolidated the
Dietz and Gion cases).
52. Id. at 43, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 38, 465 P.2d at 55, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 38, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168 (quoting Hare v. Craig, 206 Cal. 753, 757, 276
P. 336, 338 (1929)). The critical question is then "whether the public has engaged in 'long-continued
adverse use' of the land sufficient to raise the 'conclusive and undisputable presumption of knowledge and acquiescence, while at the same time it negatives the idea of a mere license.'" Id.
59. Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
For a fee owner to negate a finding of intent to dedicate based on uninterrupted public use
for more than five years, therefore, he must either affirmatively prove that he has granted
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owner must prove that he has "attempted to halt public use in [a] significant
way"; otherwise, "it will be held as a matter of law that he intended to dedicate
the property or an easement therein to the public." 6°
Although the California "dedication by adverse use" test resembles prescription law, the Gion court cautioned that
analogies from the law of adverse possession and easement by prescriptive rights can be misleading .... What must be shown is that persons
used the property believing the public had a right to such use. This
public use may not be "adverse" to the interests of the owner in the
sense that the word is used in adverse possession cases. If a trial court
finds that the public has used land without objection or interference for
finding of "adversity"
more than five years, it need not make a separate
61
to support a decision of implied dedication.
Parties "need only produce evidence that persons have used the land as
they would have used public land."'62 Citing Seaway and other cases, the Gion
court noted the importance of evidence such as the governmental agency's maintenance of the land and various groups' use of the land. 63 The distinction between "dedication by adverse use" and prescription may be a distinction without
a difference, however, if the California Gion test in fact still requires a showing
of landowner's intent, as arguably it does. If so, the public's activities simply
provide additional objective evidence of the landowner's intention.
Maryland's implied dedication law is less likely to promote public access
the public a license to use his property or demonstrate that he has made a bona fide attempt to prevent public use.

Id.
60. Id. at 41, 465 P.2d 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. 170. The Gion result was facilitated by California's
strong constitutional and statutory policies encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas.
Id. at 42, 465 P.2d 58, 84 Cal. Rptr. 170. The court was strongly influenced by the Texas Seaway
case and California's own earlier precedents, however, and probably would have reached the same
result even in the absence of these nonjudicial sources. County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal. 3d
201, 605 P.2d 381, 161 Cal. Rptr. 742, cerL denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980), supports this conclusion.
Rejecting the contention that Gion was "revolutionary" and should not be given retroactive application, the Berk court noted that "[n]ot only were the principles upon which it relied firmly imbedded
in prior decisional law, but they had previously been applied on at least one occasion to property of
the general character here involved." Id. at 215, 605 P.2d at 390, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
Berk raised questions of the applicability of implied dedication law to parties other than the
record owner, such as the beneficiaries of a deed of trust. The court concluded that the
public user.., must be held to impart knowledge of its occurrence to the world at large,
and that when it has continued for the requisite period of time a dedication to the public
will be implied in law which binds not only record owners but all persons having interests
in the subject property ....
Id. at 220, 605 P.2d at 393, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 754. Recognizing that the dedicatory period may not
have run, the court added that notice "should operate to burden the title received by the purchaser
with all accumulated public interests, even if they not be ripened into an implied dedication at the
time he receives title." Id. Berk also reaffirmed that estoppel normally will not defeat the state's
public policy in favor of allowing public access to shoreline areas. Id. at 222, 605 P.2d at 395, 161
Cal. Rptr. at 756.
61. Gion, 2 Cal. 3d at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court explained that seasonal fluctuations of use would not negate adverse use so
long as people used the land "'when they wished to do so without asking permission and without
protest from the land owners.'" Id. at 40, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (quoting Seaway Co.
v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)).
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rights than California's. In Departmentof NaturalResources v. Mayor of Ocean
City64 the Maryland Supreme Court required "clear and unequivocal manifesta-

tion" of the landowner's intent. 65 The court would not infer an intent to dedicate from long public use; such an implication "without regard to any intent to
dedicate on the part of the landowner is but a form of prescription, and as such,
all of the requisites for prescriptive rights must be met."' 66 The court concluded
that the facts did not support a public easement by prescription or dedication.
Florida courts hold that "the intention of the owner to set apart the landsfor
the use of the public is the foundation and essence of every dedication."' 67 This
requirement established by the Florida Supreme Court in City of Palmetto v.

Katsch 68 was reiterated by the Florida Court of Appeals in City ofHollywood v.
Zinkil.69 A landowner may manifest an intention to dedicate by conduct that
includes "acquiescence of the owner in the use of his property by the public for
public purposes." 70° Under the standard for implied dedication espoused in
Zinkil, a presumption of landowner's intention to dedicate should arise upon a

showing of particular facts. This presumption is apparently rebuttable, unlike
71
the presumption that arises in a Gion "adverse dedication" case.

New York's requirements for an express dedication are set forth in Gewirtz
v. City of Long Beach.72 The City of Long Beach had unrestricted title to ocean

73
front property which it expressly dedicated to public use as a park in 1936.

Thereafter, the beach was regularly used by the public and maintained by the

city. In 1970, after the city amended its beach ordinance so that the beach could
be used only "for the residents of the City of Long Beach and their invited

guests," 74 nonresidents sued, alleging that the city had already made an irrevocable dedication to the general public and could not thereafter exclude
75
nonresidents.
The New York court applied a simple two- element test, asking whether the

city landowner intended to dedicate and whether the public had accepted the
64. 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975).
65. Id. at 8, 332 A.2d at 635. The dissenting judge in Ocean City pointed out that the Texas
court in Seaway, in "essentially similar circumstances," held that the public had acquired an easement by implied dedication. 274 Md. at 22, 332 A.2d at 642 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Seaway's
theory of implied dedication contains a strong element of estoppel: "It is sufficient if the record
shows unequivocal acts or declarations of the land owner, dedicating the same to public use, and
where others act on the faith of such declarations, the land owner will be estopped to deny the
dedication .... " Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 936. The dissenter in Ocean City argued that the facts of
the case similarly raised an estoppel. Ocean City, 274 Md. at 22, 332 A.2d at 642 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
66. Ocean City, 279 Md. at 8, 332 A.2d at 635.
67. City of Palmetto v. Katsch, 86 Fla. 506, 509-10, 98 So. 352, 353 (1923).
68. Id.
69. 283 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
70. Id.
71. Gion, 2 Cal. 3d at 38, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
72. 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem. 45 A.D.2d 841, 358
N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
73. Id. at 764, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
74. Id. (quoting City of Long Beach, N.Y., Charter § 98 (1922), amended by Local Law No. 9
(1970), reprinted in 1970 LOCAL LAWS OF CrrIEs, CouNIEs, TowNS, AND VILLAGES 131, 132).
75. Id. at 767, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
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dedication. 7 6 The court believed that the intent to dedicate was unambiguous:
the city had expressly dedicated the beach and boardwalk to the public. 77 The
issue of acceptance received deeper analysis. Although the court ordinarily required acceptance, and indeed had required acceptance when the state dedicated
land to a city for park purposes, a formal dedication of a street by the state or a
municipality did not require acceptance. 78 Although the court held that acceptance probably was not required in the case, it proceeded to find implied acceptance "from the very act of dedication by the municipality." 7 9 The city played a
dual role in the dedication process-the city's intent to dedicate was clear, and
further found
this clear intent brought about implied acceptance. 80 The court
81
acceptance "in evidence of actual and continued public use."1
The completed dedication was irrevocable and, having dedicated the land to
use as a public park, the city thereafter held the beach "subject to a public trust
for the benefit of the public at large."' 82 The beach therefore could "not be diverted to other uses or sold without express legislative authority." 83 The court
concluded that a municipality may not totally exclude nonresidents from a pubbecause of
lic park, although minor differences in entrance fees might be justified
84
direct costs borne by the taxpayers of the particular municipality.
The Gewirtz public trust analysis deserves close attention. The public trust
doctrine can provide a unifying theory for protecting the public's rights because,
regardless of the theory under which the public acquired its interest, the public
trust doctrine applies thereafter. This point will be elaborated later in this
85
Article.
C.

Custom

86
The best known American custom case is State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay.
This 1969 Oregon Supreme Court decision considered whether the State had
power to prevent landowners from enclosing the dry-sand area of their coastal
land. 87 The court did not consider whether the enclosure violated Oregon zon-

76. Id. at 770, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
77. Id. at 770, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05. This express dedication was contained in a municipal
ordinance. Id. at 770, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
78. Id. at 771-72, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
79. Id. at 771, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
80. "When it thereafter adopted the ordinance mandated by the local law and proceeded to
supervise, maintain and improve the ocean front facilities, which it had itself declared to be a public
park, the city can be regarded as having accepted the facilities on behalf of the public." Id. at 771,
330 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 775, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
83. Id. at 777, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
84. Id. at 779, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 513. In stating this proposition, the court gave careful consideration to the 1972 New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of
Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972). Gewirtz, 69 Misc. 2d at 778, 330 N.Y.S.2d at
512. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing Avon-By-The-Sea).
85. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
86. 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
87. Id. at 585, 462 P.2d at 672.
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ing laws, but considered instead whether the public may have acquired an interest inthe land under alternative common-law theories.
The court first asked whether the public had acquired an interest under the
law of implied dedication. It noted that since Oregonians had historically assumed that private land boundaries did not extend beyond the high water mark
(vegetation line), the critical element of implied dedication-landowner's intent
88
to dedicate-might be difficult to establish.
The court next reviewed prescriptive easement law and concluded that "regardless of the generalizations that may apply elsewhere, [Oregon law] does not
preclude the creation of prescriptive easements in beach land for public recreational use."'8 9 The court nevertheless saw a significant shortcoming in the law of
prescription: "Strictly construed, prescription applies only to the specific tract
of land before the court, and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for
years with tract-by-tract litigation." 90
Thus bypassing implied dedication and prescription, the court chose the

English doctrine of custom as the superior doctrinal base for protecting the publie's interests in Oregon's dry-sand beaches. The opinion cited two definitions of
custom. The first, as stated in Bouvier's Law Dictionary,required" 'such a usage
as by common consent and uniform practice has become the law of the place, or
of the subject matter to which it relates.' "91 The second definition, as stated in

Blackstone's Commentaries, required that the usage be (1) ancient; (2) exercised
without interruption; (3) peaceable and free from dispute; (4) reasonable; (5) cer-

tain; (6) obligatory; and (7) not repugnant, or inconsistent, with other customs
or with other law.92 The public's use of Oregon's dry-sand beaches met all the
requirements.

93

88. Id. at 592-93, 462 P.2d at 675.
89. Id. at 594, 462 P.2d at 676.
90. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
91. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d at 677.
92. Id. at 595-97, 462 P.2d at 677.
93. Id. The court answered several objections to custom. To the contention that custom was
"unprecedented" in Oregon, the court noted, "[W]e are not the first state to recognize custom as a
source of law." Id. at 597, 462 P.2d at 677. To the contention that our political history is too short
to apply custom, the court reminded that if "antiquity were the sole test of validity of a custom,
Oregonians could satisfy that requirement by recalling that the European settlers were not the first
people to use the dry-sand area as public land." Id. at 598, 462 P.2d at 678. To the contention that
landowners had consented to the public use, the court repeated that the decision did not rest on the
law of prescription and that "elements of consent are... wholly consistent with the recognition of
public rights derived from custom." Id. at 599, 462 P.2d at 678.
Courts in this country have not uniformly accepted the doctrine of custom; however, the conclusion in Comment, supra note 30, at 174, that "[m]ost American jurisdictions have refused to
recognize customary rights in beach property" is debatable, particularly when the authority cited is
scrutinized. The decisions cited, Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 146, 244 S.E.2d 559, 569 (1978)
(stating, in dictum, that the theory of custom has never been recognized in Georgia and will not be
adopted as the law of this state in this case), and Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675, 289
N.Y.S. 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 248 A.D. 623, 623, 288 N.Y.S. 136, 137 (N.Y. App, Div.
1936) (concluding that "the right of custom... does not exist in the state of New York, and that,
even if it did, the right claimed by the plaintiffs ... is beyond the scope of the right of custom
recognized by the English law"), arguably do not foreclose the possibility that the supreme courts of
the respective states might, when carefully considering the issue of custom, yet apply the doctrine.
This author agrees, however, that Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 274
Md. 1, 12-14, 332 A.2d 630, 637-38 (1975), is strong authority that the doctrine of custom will not
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Thornton's custom rationale has influenced other courts. 94 In UnitedStates
v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc. 9S a federal district court considered whether
defendant's fences that ran from below mean low tide mark to fifty feet landward of the mean low tide mark obstructed the Virgin Islands shoreline in violation of the Virgin Islands Open Shorelines Act. 96 The court concluded that
below the mean high tide line, defendant's fences constituted trespasses against
the United States. 97 Landward of the low tide mark for fifty feet (or to the
seaward boundary of natural vegetation, whichever is the shortest distance), defendant's fences violated the territory's Open Shorelines Act.93
St. Thomas Beach Resorts rejected the contention that the Open Shorelines
Act accomplished an unconstitutional taking, holding instead that the public
had a paramount right to use the shorelands under "firmly, well settled, long
standing custom." 99 The court cited Thornton v. Hay and concluded that the
Blackstonian requirements for custom were met. 1°0 The public's use of the
beach at Bolongo Bay before defendant erected its fences
(a) existed over a long period of time; (b) was free from dispute and
was peaceable; (c) was exercised without interruption by anyone possessing a paramount right; (d) was exercised in a manner appropriate
to the beach; (e) was exercised within a definable area; (f) was similar
to that at other beaches in the jurisdiction; [and] (g) was not repugnant
to other laws.101
The Florida Supreme Court has also considered the doctrine of custom.
While the court's discussion of custom was not necessary to its decision in City
of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,102 the opinion suggests that Florida
courts'will apply the doctrine of custom. The Tona-Rama court noted that a
"right of customary use of the dry sand area of the beaches by the public does
not create any interest in the land itself."10 3 The court added that the
general public may continue to use the dry sand area for their usual
recreational activities, not because the public has any interest in the
land itself, but because of a right gained through custom to use this
particular area of the beach as they have without dispute and without
be applied in Maryland. This author would not agree, however, with the commentator's conclusion
that "given the doctrine's rejection elsewhere, North Carolina courts are unlikely to accept it."
Comment, supra note 30, at 175. This author is more optimistic that custom, as well as the public
trust doctrine, could (and indeed should) emerge as viable theories for guaranteeing public access to
North Carolina's beaches.
94. A recent Texas case, Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986) (writ
ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1911 (1987), embraced the doctrine of custom, and indicated
that earlier Texas cases had approved the doctrine. Matcha's chief influence, however, will most
likely be its analysis of "migrating property rights." Id. at 99 (discussed infra at notes 190-206).
95. 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974), aff'd mer., 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975).
96. Id. at 770.
97. Id. at 771.
98. Id. at 772.
99. Id. The court explained that the act merely codified the customary right.
100. Id. at 773.
101. Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75-78).
102. 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974); see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
103. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d at 78.
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interruption for many years.1 4
One reason, then, that defendant's sky tower was allowed to remain on the
beach was that this use was "consistent with the general recreational use by the
05
public."1

Much of Hawaii's land law is unique; hence its In re Ashford' 0 6 custom
decision, although antedating Thornton by a year, has proved less influential.

The question in Ashford was what King Kamehameha V intended in an 1866
royal patent that located the makai boundaries as running ma ke kai (along the

sea).10 7 The appellee-landowners contended that the phrase meant the mean

high water line as set by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey; the appellant State

of Hawaii contended that it meant the "high water mark that is along the edge
of vegetation or the line of debris left by the wash of waves during ordinary high
tide."' 08 The Hawaii Supreme Court held that "ma ke kai is along the upper
reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation or by
the line of debris left by the wash of waves."' 0 9
The Ashford court theorized that "Hawaii's land laws are unique in that
they are based on ancient tradition, custom, practice and usage,"' 110 and that it

was correct to accept the testimony of two kamaaina witnesses living in the area
of appellees' land "that according to ancient tradition, custom and usage, the
location of a public and private boundary dividing private land and public
beaches was along the upper reaches of the waves as represented by the edge of
vegetation or the line of debris."' n
D.

Public Trust Doctrine

Under the public trust doctrine, lands seaward of the mean high tide line
are held by the sovereign in trust for the public." 2 Although the sovereign state
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
50 Haw. 314, 440 P.2d 76, reh'g denied, 50 Haw. 452 (1968).
Id. at 315, 440 P.2d at 77.
Id.
Id.

110. Id.
Ili. Id. at 316, 440 P.2d 77-78.
112. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
108 S. Ct. 791, 795 (1988) ("Consequently, we reaffirm our long-standing precedents which hold that
the States, upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide.").
The question of the reach of the public trust doctrine should be separated from the question of
the dividing line at the water's edge for title purposes. The "high tide" states hold that private
property ends at the mean high water mark, leaving the foreshore (the area between mean low tide
and mean high tide) in public ownership. The "low tide" states hold that private property ends at
the mean low water mark, thereby leaving the foreshore as part of the littoral owner's title, unless it
has been otherwise alienated. See, eg., Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina
Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (establishing North Carolina as a high-tide
state); Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 685, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1974) (private titles extend
"as far as mean low water line or 100 rods from the mean high water line, whichever was the lesser
measure."). Although the state, without paying compensation, could interfere with private rights in
tidal area (foreshore) to promote fishing and navigation, unilateral legislative declaration of a public
right to walk in tidal area interfered with private owner's right to exclude, and would be an unconsti-
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has ownership, dominion, and sovereignty over trust lands, and can abandon or
extinguish the public's equitable right under some circumstances, a state's decision to extinguish thejuspublicum is subject to a high degree of judicial scrutiny
113
and will be set aside if particular standards are not met.
Different jurisdictions give different meanings to the public trust doc-

trine. 114 In this Article, the doctrine is used in three ways: (1) to serve as the
theoretical basis by which the public initially acquires an easement in the land of

another; (2) to assure a higher degree of judicial scrutiny and protection of public rights originally acquired by some other theoretical means, such as prescrip-

tion, dedication, or custom; and (3) to provide a factor in resolving takings
disputes. This section of the Article explores the first usage: public trust theory

as the initial source of the public's rights in the dry sand beach.
New Jersey's Supreme Court is a leader in applying the public trust doctrine to protect the public's rights to use dry sand beaches. This favorable New
Jersey view of the public trust doctrine can be traced at least as far back as
116
1821.115 In a 1972 application, the court in Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea
prohibited oceanfront municipalities from charging nonresidents higher beach
user fees than residents. The court relied on the public trust doctrine, and held

that it was "not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but
extend[ed] as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other
shore activities."'1 17 The court held that "where the upland sand area is owned
by a municipality... and dedicated to public beach purposes... the public trust

doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on
tutional taking). Massachusetts' interpretation of the public trust doctrine in tidal lands (eg., the
foreshore), unlike the New Jersey interpretation, did not include recreation. Opinion of the Justices,
365 Mass. at 688, 313 N.E.2d at 567 (comparing Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-bythe-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308-309, 294 A.2d 47 (1972)). It bears emphasizing, however, that Massachusetts recognized the public trust right of navigation and fishing even within the tidal area of the
private owner's land; the Massachusetts court in Opinion of the Justices simply would not recognize
that the scope of Massachusetts' public trust doctrine included recreation, which would otherwise
support recognition of a lateral public accessway without compensation. Id. Other jurisdictions
include recreational, ecological, and other broad public uses within the public trust doctrines. See
infra note 114 and accompanying text (recognizing that the scope of the public trust doctrine is
determined by state law). See generally I R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 163, at 698 n.13 (1984)
(differentiating between "high tide" and "low tide" states).
113. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892):
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may
be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks and piers therein ....
and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made
to the grants. It is grants of parcels.., in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which,
being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained ....

Id.
114. See PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794 ("But it has been long-established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize
private rights in such lands as they see fit." (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 26)).
115. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821); see Comment, Navigable WatersPublic Trust Doctrine, 15 RuTrERs L.J. 813, 823-32 (1985) (tracing history of public trust doctrine
and concluding Matthews, infra note 122, was not an unconstitutional taking because there was no
interference with investment-backed expectations).
116. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
117. Id. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54.
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equal terms and without preference and that any contrary state or municipal
action is impermissible."' 1 8
In 1978 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended Avon-By-The-Sea. In Van
Ness v. Borough of Deal1 19 the court considered the public's rights in a casino
beach which was owned by a municipality, but, unlike the beach in Avon-ByThe-Sea, had never been formally dedicated to the use of the general public.
The court deemed the lack of formal dedication immaterial because the "beach
is dedicated to recreational uses including bathing, swimming, surf fishing and
other shore activities." 120 The court also rejected the contention that the public
trust doctrine did not apply because the area in front of the casino in its natural
state had been unsuitable for normal beach activities and became a useful beach
area only after a bluff was leveled and graded. The court required the municipally owned beach to be opened to the general public.
The holdings in Avon-By-The-Sea and Van Ness were limited to public
rights in the dry sand areas of municipally owned beaches. 12 1 The 1984 case of
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association 122 however, addressed the extent of the public's interest in privately owned dry sand beaches. Construed
most narrowly, Matthews considered only "whether, ancillary to the public's
right to enjoy the tidal lands, the public has a right to gain access through and to
use the dry sand area not owned by a municipality, but by a quasi-public
body."' 123 A not-for-profit association owned six parcels of the seventy-six parcels of Bay Head land bordering the beach. The association owned land at the
end of seven streets that extended through the upper dry sand to the mean high
water line; it also leased other upper dry sand areas from private owners of
beachfront property. Membership in the association was generally limited to
residents of Bay Head, and, with minor exceptions, only members were allowed
to use the beach during the normal summer daytime beach hours. The court
found that the association was the municipality's beach maintenance arm, had a
virtual monopoly, and should be characterized as "quasi-public" in nature. 124
Under this construction, Matthews simply extends application of the rationale of
Avon-By-The-Sea and Van Ness for muncipally owned land to land owned by a
quasi-public association.
Matthews, however, should be construed more broadly. The court stated:
"Today, recognizing the increasing demand for our State's beaches and the dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find that the public must be given
both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably neces118. Id. at 308-09, 294 A.2d at 54.
119. 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978).
120. Id. at 179, 393 A.2d at 573-74.
121. Id. at 176, 393 A.2d at 572; Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. at 299-300, 294 A.2d at 49.
122. 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
123. Id. at 312, 471 A.2d at 358.
124. Id. at 328-30, 471 A.2d at 367-68. The court added, "a nonprofit association that is authorized and endeavors to carry out a purpose serving the general welfare of the community and is a
quasi-public institution holds in trust its powers of exclusive control in the areas of vital public
concern." Id. at 332, 471 A.2d at 367. "Indeed, the Association is frustrating the public's right
under the public trust doctrine. It should not be permitted to do so." Id.at 332, 471 A.2d at 368.
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sary." 125 The opinion includes extensive history and analysis of why the public
trust doctrine should apply to privately held dry sand beaches.1 26 Although this
part of the opinion was arguably not necessary to the final holding, it seems clear
that, in future cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court will apply the public trust
doctrine to privately owned dry sand beaches.
Because Matthews requires that the public have reasonable access 127 to the
foreshore and dry sand, the critical question becomes: what constitutes "reasonable access?" One possible approach, which the Matthews court adopted and
which is analyzed further in the next section of this Article, is to borrow from
the analytical techniques of the law of nuisance. Under this approach the
touchstone ...is that the particular circumstances must be considered
and examined before arriving at a solution that will accommodate the
public's right and the private interests involved.... The test is whether
those means [e.g., availability of nearby publicly owned beaches or
streets to the wet sands] are reasonably satisfactory so that the public's
1 28
right to use the beachfront can be satisfied
As with many land use issues, the solution will "depend on the circumstances."' 129 But "where use of dry sand is essential or reasonably necessary for
enjoyment of the ocean, the [public trust] doctrine warrants the public's use of
the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation of the interests of the
owner." 130 Relevant factors include "llocation of the dry sand area in relation
to the foreshore, extent and availability of publicly- owned upland sand area,
nature and extent of the public demand, and usage of the upland sand land by
13 1
the owner."
E. Comparison of Acquisition Theories
Prescription and implied dedication continue to be useful in establishing
public rights in private coastal lands. But each doctrine has significant shortcomings. Permissive use often defeats prescription, 132 and a lack of landowner's
intention to dedicate often defeats implied dedication. 133 Even if these requirements are met, claimants must bring a separate lawsuit for each parcel in which
they assert a public easement. 134
125. Id. at 332, 471 A.2d at 365.
126. Id. at 332, 471 A.2d at 360-63.
127. The court stated:
[While the public's rights in private beaches are not co-extensive with the rights enjoyed in
municipal beaches, private landowners may not in all instances prevent the public from
exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine. The public must be afforded reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.
Id. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365-66 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 324-25, 471 A.2d at 365.
129. Id. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 30, 36-38 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 42-77 and accompanying text; see also supra note 41 and accompanying
text (discussing problems of acceptance by the public).
134. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Prescription, which modem courts treat as closely resembling adverse possession, 135 applies only if there has been open, adverse use by the public. A
landowner who wants to prevent a prescriptive period from running is therefore
motivated to prevent any public use at all, for if she gives permission to the
public (which theoretically prevents prescription from applying) she runs the
risk of impliedly dedicating a public easement of passage. To avoid both prescription and implied dedication, the landowner will therefore have to construct
a fence or other unsightly barrier.
Custom, as applied in Thornton v. Hay,136 is superior to prescription and
implied dedication as a doctrinal base for supporting public access. The doctrine
has deep roots in the English common law 137 but has not always been uniformly
recognized by American courts. Thornton has influenced other state supreme
courts 13 8 and may signal a more receptive judicial attitude to the doctrine of
custom, at least in promoting public access to beaches.
Carol Rose offers some provocative arguments why custom should support
increased public access to beaches. 139 She first analyzes why law has long given

special protection to commerce, free speech, and other social practices. Practices, she asserts, "that enhance the sociability of the practitioners have greater
returns with great scale: one cannot get too much of them."' 14° Professor Rose
also notes society's "increasing perception of recreation as having something
analogous to scale returns, and as a socializing institution."' 14 1 If we accept Professor Rose's arguments, "we might believe that unique recreational sites ought
not be private property; their greatest value lies in civilizing and socializing all
members of the public, and this value should not be 'held up' by private owners."' 14 2 This approach would broaden public rights in dry sands, the area between the mean high tide line and the vegetation line, which, although subject to
tidal action, is often held in private ownership. 143 Public recreational use is
arguably the most valuable use of the dry sands, and the public's long customary
use of many of these lands arguably has resulted in its acquisition of customary
rights.
The Matthews case1'44 shows the relevance of the public trust doctrine to the
135. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

136. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); see supra notes 86-93 and
accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text; see also supra note 93 (disagreeing with the
conclusion in Comment, supra note 30, that North Carolina courts are not likely to accept the
doctrine of custom).
139. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
140. Id. at 777.

141. Id at 779.
142. Id at 780.
143. "Wet sands" below the mean high tide line have historically been treated as public prop-

erty. See supranote 28 (defining "dry sand") and infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (relat-

ing "dry sand" and "wet sand" concepts to Nollan). But see supra note 112 (discussion of"low tide"
states).
144. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984); see supra
notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
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question of public access over privately held dry sands. The New Jersey
Supreme Court coupled "the increasing demand for our State's beaches and the
dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine" 145 and applied the public trust doctrine to ensure reasonablepublic access. 146 Other courts should follow the Matthews lead, for the public trust doctrine is a state common-law doctrine1 47 that is
flexible enough to accommodate this application.
III.

A.

COMMON-LAw DoCmnqNs FOR PROTECTING EXISTING PUBLIC
INTERESTS IN BEACHES

General Governmental Remedies

Many public accessways to beaches are held by a state or local government
in its capacity as an ordinary proprietor. Some lands and waters are held in
trust for the public. In order to ensure access to these public lands, a state or
local government can generally avail itself of the same remedies available to private landowners. 148 It is questionable, however, whether private individuals and
145. Matthews, 95 NJ. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365.
146. Id. at 332, 471 A.2d at 369.
147. See supra note 114; see also Comment, supra note 30, at 200 (recommending that the
"North Carolina courts expand the public trust doctrine to include recreational use of the dry-sand
beach"); Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1, 16-18
(1972) (discussing public trust doctrine in North Carolina); Comment, Defining Navigable Waters
and the Application of the Public- Trust Doctrine in North Carolina: A History and Analysis, 49
N.C.L. REV. 888 (1971) (same).
The rationale for a public trust theory of public rights to use the beach is not dissimilar to the
rationale which supports an easement of necessity. When an estate is land locked, its value is diminished and its use inhibited unless there is an easement for ingress and egress implied in the conveyance. The elements of an easement for ingress and egress implied by necessity are (1) the dominant
and servient estates were originally owned by the same person; (2) the roadway is a necessity; and
(3) the necessity for the roadway existed at the time the tracts were severed. Waggoner v. Gleghorn,
378 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1964). Use of the beach for access to the public trust lands can be analogized to use of an easement across private land to reach landlocked property. See generally Chavez,
Public Access to Landlocked Public Lands, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1373 (1987) (discussing public access
to lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management and concluding that public trust doctrine not
yet applicable to whatever lands contain little or no water). But cf.Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,
440 U.S. 668, 679-80, 682 (1979) (refusing to imply a right of way on the grounds of common-law
necessity because congressional intent to reserve rights of way was not clear and because of "the
substantial impact that such implications would have on property rights granted over 100 years
ago"). Arguably, though, public expectations protected by the public trust doctrine predate the
original conveyances from the state, and the rationale for applying the public trust doctrine is significantly distinguishable from the rationale supporting implied easements of necessity.
For a discussion of the public trust doctrine's relevance to takings disputes, see infra notes 22899 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan v. California CoastalCommission, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987), and the relationship of the takings issue to the public trust doctrine). Although the public
trust doctrine was not before the Supreme Court in the Nollan case, see infra notes 278-99 and
accompanying text, in many takings cases, the public trust doctrine will be relevant, see infra notes
378-80 and accompanying text. When courts apply the usual multi-factored balancing test in takings
disputes, an important factor will often be the proximity of proposed development to public trust
lands, see infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text, and the reasonableness of the regulation in
protecting reasonablepublic access to public property.
148. See, eg., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
[Tihe Government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary proprietor,
to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. It may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming property.... To this extent no
legislation was necessary to vindicate the rights of the Government as a landed proprietor.
Id. at 524.
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public interest organizations have standing to bring actions to protect public
interests in the event the attorney general or other designated public representative fails to do so. The states' different standing requirements for abating public
nuisances, removing purprestures, and redressing breaches of the public trust are
not analyzed in this Article, but often pose impediments to individual action. 149
B. Public Nuisances and Purprestures
Public nuisance has been defined as "an act or omission 'which obstructs or
causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common
to all Her Majesty's subjects.' "150 The term encompasses a multitude of offenses against the public.151 Purpresture, akin to a public nuisance, is an encroachment that injures the public as an aggregate body in the enjoyment of
public lands or navigable streams.15 2 A purpresture is often also a public nuisance, although it is possible to have a purpresture that is not a public nuisance.153 This portion of the Article focuses on the nuisance aspect of
obstruction of lateral and vertical access to tidal and submerged lands, and, by
149. See, eg., Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d, 382, 384
(Fla. 1953) ("To entitle private individuals to maintain actions to enjoin public nuisances, it must be
shown that they have sustained special or peculiar injuries different in kind, not merely in degree,
from the injury to the public at large."). For reference to a statute that liberalizes standing, see State
ex reL Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ("An action to
abate a public nuisance may be brought by a citizen of the county in the name of the state (§ 60.05(1)
Fla. Stat., F.S.A.), without the necessity of prior application to the state's attorney to bring the suit
and without necessity for the citizen relator to show he has sustained or will sustain special damages
or injury different in kind from injury to the public at large." (citation and footnote omitted)). See
generally Comment, Public Nuisance: Standing to Sue Without Showing "Special Injury", 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 360 (1974) (analyzing Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 286 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1973), and arguing that the trend is
away from "special injury" toward "injury-in-fact").
150. W. KEETON, D. DoBns, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 90 at 643 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (citing STEPHEN, GENERAL
VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 1890 105; SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 233 (8th ed.
1934); Mayor of Alpine v. Brewster, 7 N.J. 42, 80 A.2d 297 (1951)).
151. Examples include obstruction of navigable waters, obstruction of a public highway or impeding travel thereon, encroachment of a public street and matters offensive to the senses, though
not injurious to health. J. JOYCE & H. JoYcE, NUISANCES § 414 (1906). A public nuisance must
affect an interest common to the general public and is, therefore, distinguishable from a private
nuisance. It is possible, however, that a public nuisance will also be a private nuisance in a particular
case.

152. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1893) ("[E]very building or wharf erected, without
license, below high water mark, where the soil is the King's, is a purpresture, and may, at the suit of
the King, either be demolished, or be seized and rented for his benefit, if it is not a nuisance to
navigation."); Williams v. Guthrie, 137 So. 682, 685 (Fla. 1931) ("A 'purpresture,' or more properly
speaking 'porpresture,' is an invasion of the right of property in the soil while the same remains in
the king or sovereign."); State v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682, 686, 11 S.W. 119, 120 (1888) (" '[A]
purpresture strictly is an encroachment upon a public right in lands or navigable streams that does
not operate as an obstruction or injury to individual members of the public, but only to some right in
incident and peculiar to it in its aggregate capacity as such."' (quoting H. WOOD, THE LAW OF
NUISANCE § 84 at 87 (1875))).
153. See Shively v. Bowiby, 152 U.S. 1, 13.
An unauthorized invasion of the rights of the public to navigate the water flowing over the
soil is a public nuisance; and an unauthorized encroachment upon the soil itself is known in
law as a purpresture. Purpresture is also a particular kind of nuisance. The word is derived from the French word pourpris, which signifies an inclosure.
People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 146, 4 P. 1152, 1155 (1884).
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analogy, obstruction of highways, navigable streams, or access to other public

lands.
The 1888 Texas Supreme Court case of State v. Goodnight154 is a purpresture and public nuisance case with important implications for protecting public

access to beaches. Defendant Charles Goodnight enclosed over 600,000 acres of
Texas' public school land and over 14,000 acres of Texas' unappropriated public

domain by constructing fences on his own ranch and, where the fences were not
complete, by preventing passage with line riders.155 This enclosure prevented

use of the public lands for grazing purposes, interfered with movement of stock
156
to market, and obstructed public travel.

The Texas Supreme Court defined a purpresture as "an encroachment upon

a public right in lands or navigable streams that does not operate as an obstruction or injury to individual members of the public, but only to some right incident and peculiar to it in its aggregate capacity as such." 1 57 The court
concluded that the enclosures were both a purpresture and public nuisance.

The inclosure of public lands for private use, whether viewed as a
wrong merely to the body politic or as an infringement of the privileges

of its citizens, is a nuisance subject to be abated at the suit of the State,

and an injunction is a well recognized and appropriate remedy.1 58
Goodnight differs in at least two aspects from many purpresture cases.
First, the purpresture did not physically intrude upon public land; the fences
and line riders were located on adjoining private property.' 5 9 Second, the court
apparently held that encroachment upon an intangible public right 16 -the
value of the public land for sale or lease-is a purpresture.
The Goodnight court's willingness to apply purpresture law to intangible
public rights suggests some modem adaptations, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's recent recognition that public rights protected by the public
trust doctrine can include, in addition to navigation, "bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral development." 16 1 Perhaps developments on adjacent
private lands that substantially interfere with the aggregate public rights protected by the public trust doctrine can be enjoined as common law nuisances or
154. 70 Tex. 682, 11 S.W. 119 (1888).
155. 70 Tex. at 685-86, 11S.W. at 119.
156. Id. In addition, these inclosures were contrary to state policy and expressly forbidden by
statute. Id. at 686-87, 11 S.W. at 119-20.
157. Id. at 686, 11 S.W. at 119 (citing H. WooD, THE LAW OF NuISANCE § 84, at 87 (1875)).
158. Id. The suit for injunction in this case was brought by the state through its attorney general. The court viewed this as the procedurally correct manner due to legislation recently passed by
the Texas legislature. Id. at 689, 11 S.W. at 120.
159. The State's petition alleged that the defendant had "enclosed the lands of the State; not that
they [had] erected the enclosures upon [the state's lands]." Id. at 687, 11 S.W. at 120.
160. Id. at 686, 11 S.W. at 119.
161. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 798 (1988) (citing Treuting v. Bridge
and Park Comm'n of City of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627, 632-33 (Miss. 1967)); see also Marks v. Whitney,
6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971) ("sufficiently flexible to
encompass changing public needs ....
[such as] ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably
affect the scenery and climate of the area.").
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purprestures. This is another way of explaining the result in the Matthews public trust case, discussed above, 162 requiring reasonable public access to privately
held dry sand beaches.
By contrast, California purpresture cases appear to require a physical encroachment on public lands. In the 1884 case of People v. Gold Run Ditch &
Mining Co., 163 for example, defendant, a hydraulic mine owner, dumped its hydraulic debris into a nonnavigable stream which flowed into the navigable Sacramento River. The California Supreme Court held that the debris constituted
both a public nuisance because of its interference with navigation (interference
with the flow of the water) and a purpresture (an unauthorized encroachment
upon the soil itself). 164 In Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. v. Unosuke Higashi,165
decided during World War II, the California District Court of Appeals held that
a building constructed without license upon the tide lands of the state became at
once the property of the state. The building was a purpresture, which belonged
to the state as the owner of the soil to which the building was affixed. 166
Obstructions of public highways have been a rich source of purpresture and
public nuisance law.1 67 For example, in Smith v. McDowell ex rel. Hall,168 defendant constructed an area way and stairs on a major street. 1 69 The issue was
whether "power exists in the corporate authorities to vacate a street, or a portion
of a street, for the benefit and use of a private person." 170 The court stated that
the streets were dedicated to the use of the public as streets, and the village held
them "in trust for such uses and purposes, and none other."' 7 1 Although under
proper circumstances the state legislature might abandon streets to further the
public interest, the court clarified that its general reference to the village's power
to "vacate" should not be construed as blanket authority to abandon any
street.1 72 The court stated:
The municipality, in respect of its streets, is a trustee for the general
public, and holds them for the use to which they are dedicated. The
fundamental idea of a street is, not only that it is public, but that it is
public in all its parts, for free and unobstructed passage thereon by all
persons desiring to use

it.173

Therefore, the village can exercise the right to "vacate the same" only after
162. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984); see supra
notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
163. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
164. Id. at 147, 4 P. at 1155-56.
165. 56 Cal. App. 2d 709, 133 P.2d 487 (1943).
166. Id. at 712, 133 P.2d at 488.
167. Eg., Smith v. McDowell ex rel. Hall, 148 Ill. 51, 35 N.E. 141 (1893); Mamolella v. First
Bank of Oak Park, 97 Il. App. 3d 579, 423 N.E.2d 204 (1981); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n
v. Johns, 507 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Hale County v. Davis, 572 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978); Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 425 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
168. 148 Ill. 51, 35 N.E. 141 (1893).
169. Id. at 54, 35 N.E. at 141.

170. Id. at 60, 35 N.E. at 142.
171. Id. at 62, 35 N.E. at 143.
172. Id. at 63, 35 N.E. at 143.
173. Id.
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proper determination that the street is "no longer required for the public use or
convenience." 174 Having found that the construction was a purpresture and a
public nuisance, the court then added that "as the municipality itself cannot be
no one can justify the creation of a nuisance
justified in creating a nuisance,
175
under a license from it."'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently applied private nuisance law in
Prah v. Maretti,176 a case concerning access to sunlight. Although access to
sunlight is distinguishable in important ways from access to public beaches, Prah
is instructive in showing a modem court's willingness to apply nuisance law in
novel ways. In Prah the court held that a proposed residence might so unreasonably interfere with the neighbor's passive solar collector as to constitute an
actionable private nuisance. 177 Although the builder had complied with all applicable land-use controls, the court noted that this did not automatically bar a
nuisance claim.' 78 If the proposed use unreasonably interferes with a neighbor's
enjoyment of his property, the use constitutes a nuisance. 179
The public ought to have a parallel right under public nuisance law to protect its access to public lands. If a littoral or riparian owner proposes construction that unreasonably interferes with the public's access to lands held in
common by the public, a court should enjoin the private construction as a public
nuisance. Goodnight arguably is authority for this approach by its application of
purpresture and public nuisance law even when a construction does not physically intrude upon public land.' 8 0
Goodnight, though, was an easy case with respect to causation. Evidence
was clear that Goodnight's acts alone denied public access. In most beach access cases, no single proposed house will substantially interfere with the public's
rights of access. The cumulative effects of many houses will cause the loss of
public access. "Acts Harmless in Themselves Which Together Cause Damage"' 8'1 present classic hombook problems. If the judiciary closes its eyes and
refuses redress against each individual because that individual's contribution
was harmless in itself, redress will be completely denied. To provide redress,
several courts have held that acts which viewed individually are innocuous may
be tortious if, in combination, they cause damage; the standard of care applica174. Id. at 65, 35 N.E. at 144.
175. Id. at 67, 35 N.E. at 144. Quoting Judge Dillon, the court noted that "[tihe king... can
not license the erection or commission of a nuisance; nor in this country, can a municipal corporation do so by virtue of any implied or general power." Id.
176. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
177. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had earlier adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
definition of private nuisance as "'a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land.'" Id. at 231, 321 N.W.2d at 187 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821D (1977)).

178. Id. at 242, 321 N.W.2d at 192 (citing Bie v. Ingersoll, 27 Wis. 2d 490, 135 N.W.2d 250

(1965)).
179. "The phrase 'interest in the private use and enjoyment of land' as used in sec. 821D [of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS] is broadly defined to include any disturbance of the enjoyment
of property." Prah, 108 Wis. 2d at 232, 321 N.W.2d at 187.
180. State v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682, 11 S.W. 119 (1888); see supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
181. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 150, § 52, at 354.
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ble to each defendant requires consideration of all surrounding circumstances,
182
including other defendants' activities.
Courts then must fashion tests of reasonableness that measure each individual's actions against a standard that considers the impact upon the public if
every other landowner, similarly situated, is allowed to proceed as requested. If
it is reasonably foreseeable that the totality of probable construction would be an
actionable nuisance if undertaken by a single developer, then no individual
should be allowed to proceed without showing
a plan that would protect public
183
access for some reasonable future period.
C.

Public Trust Doctrine

Public accessway easements, whether originally acquired by prescriptive

easement, 184 implied dedication,18 5 custom, 18 6 or otherwise, should be treated

as held by the state in trust for the public. The public's easement is appurtenant
to the public's dominant interest, protected by the public trust doctrine, 187 in the

area below the mean high tide line. Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach 188 provides
support for the proposition that once the public acquires an easement in property appurtenant to public trust land, the easement should also be held in public
trust. In Gewirtz the Supreme Court of Nassau County, New York held that the
municipality's express dedication of land to the public for park purposes was
irrevocable and thereafter the park was held in a public trust for the benefit of
the public at large. Consequently, the park could not be diverted to other uses
or sold without express legislative authority.18 9

Public access easements acquired by implication should not be treated differently from the fee simple titles to parks and streets acquired by express dedication. In the case of public ways of ingress and egress to publicly owned tidal
and submerged lands, the easements are appurtenant to the public's trust lands
and should be held in trust. The scope of the trust could be the public purposes
182. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 150, § 52, at 354.
183. The difficulties of cumulative impact are well illustrated in the Supreme Court's Nollan
case. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987); see infra notes 228-99 and
accompanying text (analyzing Nollan).
184. E.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974); see supra notes
30-38 and accompanying text.
185. E.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); see
supra notes 39-85 and accompanying text.
186. E.g., State ex reL Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); see supra notes 86111 and accompanying text.
187. Cf Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.L 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984)
(public trust doctrine requires that "public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned
dry sand areas as reasonably necessary."). Whether the easement is "vertical," such as an accessway
from the nearest road to the beach, or "lateral," such as an accessway running parallel with the
water's edge and along the water's edge, it would benefit the public's tidal and submerged lands
protected by the public trust doctrine. See supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Matthews and the public trust doctrine).
188. 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem., 45 A.D.2d 841, 358
N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974).
189. See Smith v. McDowell, 148 Il.51, 64-67, 35 N.E. 141, 144 (1893).
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for which the interests were dedicated, so long as these purposes are consistent
with the public purposes for which the dominant lands are held in trust.
Easements acquired pursuant to the doctrines of custom and prescription
could, like express and implied easements, also be treated as appurtenant to the
dominant tidal and submerged lands held in trust for the public. The scope of
the easements could be limited to the public purposes supported by ancient custom or the adverse uses giving rise to the prescriptive right, if these purposes are
consistent with the public purposes for which the dominant lands are held in
trust.
D. Migrating ("Rolling") Easements
Easements generally have fixed boundaries that remain unchanged.190 The
burdened landowner can prevent the easement holder from using the landowner's land outside the easement's defined boundaries. 19 1 This general principle is unworkable, however, for lands strongly affected by the sea. If the general
principle of fixed boundaries is pushed to its logical conclusion-if the boundaries of public easements to use the dry sand beach are frozen once perfectederosion could result in the public's easement being entirely covered by water, or
reliction could leave the public easement far landward of the water's edge and
192
useless for its original purposes.
Legal doctrine has long sought to differentiate littoral and riparian land law
from land law generally. 193 Legal boundaries of the fee simple title change, for
190. Compare Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 208-09 (Tex. 1963) (easement
for pleasure and recreation over a 1000-acre ranch including the right to study nature, picnic, hike,
ride horses, camp out, bird watch, and other similar activities unenforceable, inter alia, because of
lack of definiteness or certainty in the servitudes sought to be established on the servient estate) and
Speight v. Anderson, 226 N.C. 492, 496, 39 S.E.2d 371, 374 (1946) (prescriptive easement requires
user "confined to a definite and specific line. While there may be slight deviations in the line of
travel there must be a substantial identity of the thing enjoyed.") with West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33,
326 S.E.2d 601 (1985) (applying "substantial identity" test but allowing question to go to jury) and
Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. App. 1986) ("Although an easement is generally a static
real property concept, several Texas opinions have recognized that easements bordering on a body of
water may be moved by the water's action."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1911 (1987). See generallyR.
CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984) (discussing

scope and location of easements); Comment, supranote 30, at 168 ("The Slick decision suggests that
the North Carolina Supreme Court will apply the substantial identity test liberally when considering
beach easements.").
191. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 190, § 8.9, at 458-61.
192. See Matcha, 711 S.W.2d at 100 ("An easement fixed in place while the beach moves would
result in the easement being either under water or left high and dry inland, detached from the shore.
Such easement, meant to preserve the public right to use and enjoy the beach, would then cease
functioning for that purpose."). See generally Dinkins, Texas Seashore Boundary Law: The Effect
of Naturaland ArtificialModifications, 10 Hous. L. REv. 43 (1972) (discussing movement of dry
sand beach boundaries). Dinkins writes:
The doctrine of reliction increases the upland estate when the water permanently uncovers
the land, leaving it dry.... Accretion is the addition of land to the upland estate by the
water depositing alluvion imperceptibly over a long period of time.... State law generally
allows the owner of the upland estate to take title to accretion resulting wholly from natural causes.... Erosion changes the boundary slowly and imperceptibly, and the littoral
owner loses title to the eroded portion of his land.
Id. at 46, 50 (footnotes omitted).
193. See, eg., Matcha, 711 S.W.2d at 99 ("The law in this State has recognized migrating prop-
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the most part, when natural boundaries such as the mean high tide line

change. 194 Consider, for example, disputes between littoral landowners and the
public. Tidal and submerged lands seaward of mean high tide land are held by

the sovereign in trust for the public.195 Even if the record title includes lands
below the mean high tide line, the private and public interests will be determined

by the location of the ever-changing mean high tide line. 196 Erosion will cause a
loss of private dominion; 1 97 reliction and alluvion will cause a gain of land to the
private landowner. 198

The common law has also accounted for changes at the water's edge when
public easements are at issue. The well known English case of Mercer v.

Denne,199 for example, considered the fishermen's custom of drying fishing nets
on the beach. When the landowner attempted to stop this practice, the court not
only recognized that the fishermen had acquired a right through custom to dry
their nets on the shore, but also held that although the beach area had migrated
over the years, "[t]he custom began at the boundary between beach and sea" and
"would always be adjacent to the boundary for the time being between the beach
200

and the sea."
The unfortunate facts in Matcha v. Mattox ex rel. People20 1 arose against
this history of coastal land law. In 1982 the Matchas built a beach house on
their Galveston beach lot immediately landward of the natural vegetation line.
In the summer of 1982 powerful Hurricane Alicia hit the Matcha's beach house
and almost totally destroyed it. The hurricane caused such significant erosion to
the natural vegetation line that, after the hurricane passed, the Matchas' beach
house was located seaward of the newly eroded natural vegetation line. Under
the Texas Open Beaches Law, which preserves for the public any previously
erty rights in several contexts.... [and] the rule is well-established that erosion and accretion along a
river can move property lines."). See generally Dinkins, supra note 192, at 46-50 (discussing legal
implications of movement of dry sand beaches).
194. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 793 (1988) (holding that Mississippi acquired "'fee simple title to all lands naturally subject to tidal influence, inland to today's
mean high water mark'" (quoting Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 510 (1986)).
195. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
196. Eg., County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 872 (1974); City of Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
197. Eg., County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Haw. 176, 517 P.2d 57 (1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 872 (1974); City of Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
198. Reliction and alluvion are defined supra at note 192. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290
(1967); Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
199. 2 Ch. 538 (1905).
200. Id. at 579. In Nonken v. Bexar County, 221 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), the court
had a similar problem with the movement of a roadway acquired by prescriptive easement. The road
had moved approximately thirty-five feet from its location shown in 1913 field notes. Id. at 374.
Against an argument of loss due to non-use, the court stated that a dirt road, due to rains and
washouts in the river bottom, would ordinarily vary from the earlier established path. However,
"[it does not follow that rights acquired by the public years ago were lost by failure of the public to
travel the full width of the old road." Id. See also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336-39 (1876)
(riparian owner's title would ordinarily include accretions from natural causes, but when city filled
waterward of original high water mark, riparian owner's "bare legal title" waterward of the original
mark was subject to public's easement and use); Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29, 35 (1850)
(waterward boundary of public landing dedicated on navigable water course fluctuates with margin
of water; otherwise, "enjoyment would be precarious, and often destroyed.").
201. 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1911 (1987).
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existing public interest in the beach area between the low water mark and the
natural vegetation line,20 2 the Matcha's house was now located within the
boundaries that were presumptively subject to a public easement. Soon after the
hurricane, the Matchas began filling their lot and planting grass seaward of the
natural line of vegetation. When they began rebuilding their house, the attorney
general obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting continuation of repairs.
The trial judge concluded that the public had earlier acquired rights in the
beach area and that "such public right of access, use, and easement follows the
beach as the beach moves landward and seaward with the natural movements of
the line of mean low tide and the natural line of vegetation .. ,,203 Finding
that the Matchas' improvements after the hurricane occupied a portion of the
beach protected by common law and the Texas Open Beaches Law, the court
held that the beach house, sand piles, and vegetation plantings constituted interferences with the free and unrestricted public right of access to the beach. The
court accordingly ordered the Matchas to remove the beach house and other
structures and refrain from any activity that interfered with the public's access
to and use of the beach area.
The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the lower court judgment mainly because of its conclusion that the public had acquired an interest in the Matchas'
land by custom.2° 4 The court deemed the theory of a migratory public easement

compatible with the doctrine of custom.
A public easement on a beach cannot have been established with reference to a set of static lines on the beach, since the beach itself, and
hence the public use of it, surely fluctuated landward and seaward over
time. The public easement, if it is to reflect the reality of the public's
actual use of the beach, must migrate as did the customary use from
which it arose. The law cannot freeze such an easement at one place
any more than the law can freeze the beach itself. Custom is, after all,
a reflection in law of a long-standing public practice, and therefore the
205
legal result should mirror the factual reality as closely as possible.
Both the 6Texas Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied
20
review.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.011-.025 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1988).
Matcha, 711 S.W.2d at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 100.
The Texas Supreme Court refused the writ because there was no reversible error. The

United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Matcha v. Mattox, 107 S.Ct. 1911 (1987). Shortly
after Matcha was decided, another appellate court in Texas ruled that the public's easement on the
beach rolled landward and seaward with the vegetation line and that this concept was implicit in the
Open Beaches Act. Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). The owners' challenge
to the constitutionality of the rolling easement theory on due process and equal protection grounds
was rejected because they had not raised the issue at the trial level. Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 115. In
contrast to Texas, a Maryland court refused to recognize a rolling easement theory when an Atlantic
hurricane shifted the line of the beach inland. Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor and City
Council of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975). In Department of Natural Resources v.
Cropper, 274 Md. 25, 332 A.2d 644 (1975), a Maryland court refused to prevent the littoral owner
from exercising a legal right incident to ownership--e-g., constructing a house on his propertyafter changes in the coastline placed his property seaward of a dune. The court, however, left open
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THE TAKING ISSUE
7

20
The fifth amendment's prohibition of takings without just compensation
is often implicated when public rights are asserted on private lands. Two types
of cases present little dispute on the takings issue. If the public has earlier ac20 8
quired an interest by prescription, dedication, or other common-law theory,
governmental enforcement of the public's rights is not a taking. 20 9 If the public
does not have an interest, but the government unilaterally authorizes a permanent, public easement across private lands, courts will undoubtedly characterize
this unilateral attempt to create a public easement as a taking requiring just
210
compensation.
The Supreme Court, while conceding that takings jurisprudence cannot be
reduced to a "set formula," 21 1 has attempted to clarify takings law in several
recent cases. The Court's position on the remedies question is now clear: regulation may, at some point, constitute a taking, and, if so, just compensation must
be paid for the temporary taking. 2 12 But the threshold question of whether an
otherwise valid regulation has gone "too far" 2 13 still remains one of the most
difficult issues in property law.
Generally, the Supreme Court applies a multifactored balancing approach
to takings questions. Important factors include the following:
(1) the character of the government action, especially whether there is a
2 14
permanent physical occupation or appropriation;

the issue of the public's right to use the dry sand beach in a manner that did not unreasonably
interfere with the owner's possessory rights. Cropper, 274 Md. at 28, 332 A.2d at 646.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation") is applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1240 n.10 (1987);
Chicago B. & Q. RR. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
208. See supra notes 30-147 and accompanying text.
209. But cf.Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (landowner entitled to accretions under
applicable federal law at time of patent even though subsequent state law provided that accretions
belonged to the State of Washington). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes explained that
"unpredictable" prospective changes in state property law can constitute a compensable taking,
although changes conforming with "reasonable expectations" would not. Id. at 297 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Thus, if the public's easement was perfected before the original patent or was perfected
subsequent to the patent, but pursuant to reasonably expected common law or statutory theories, no
taking would occur. If the public's interest were perfected subsequent to the original grant under
statutory or common law that had changed sharply and "unpredictably" subsequent to the grant, a
credible takings question might arise.
210. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987). The Court stated:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront
available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach,
rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we
have no doubt there would have been a taking.

Id.
211. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
212. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
213. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
214. See, eg., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US. 419, 435-36 (1982).
Cf Penn CentralTransp. Co., 438 U.S. at 128 ("[G]overnment actions that may be characterized as
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(2) whether the regulation
interests";

215

"substantially

advances legitimate state

the regulation prevents a public harm or confers a public
(3) whether
6
21

benefit;
(4) the economic impact of the regulation, especially the extent to which
the regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations, 2 17 the extent of the diminution of value (whether the regulation denies economically viable use of the property), 2 18 and the extent to which the regulation achieves an
average reciprocity of benefit and burden;2 19 and
220
(5) whether the regulation is fair and just.
The Court will sometimes find a regulatory taking without engaging in a
multifactored balancing process. The clearest example of a "per se" 221 taking is
acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to
constitute 'takings.' ").
215. See, eg., Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3146; see also Penn Central,438 U.S. at 127 ("a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial government purpose"). See generally Peterson, supra note 17, at 339-58 (discussing the
effect of Nollan on takings jurisprudence).
216. See, eg., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1244 (1987);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Graham v.
Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981) (including in a list of factors to be
considered: "Whether the regulation confers a public benefit or prevents a public harm"). Cf Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to the "nuisance exception to the
taking guarantee": government can prevent a property owner from using his property to injure
others without having to compensate the owner for the value of the forbidden use").
217. See, eg., Penn Central,438 U.S. at 127 (attributing the "distinct investment-backed expectations" test to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). See generally Mandelker,
Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 J. URBAN & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987) ("In
Penn Central... Justice Brennan added a new factor to the judicial lexicon of the taking clause. A
taking may occur... when legislation frustrates "distinct investment-backed expectations.").
218. See, eg., Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
219. See, eg., Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914). Justice Holmes distinguished Pennsylvania Coal from Plymouth Coal as follows: "unlike the Kohler Act, the statute
challenged in Plymouth Coal dealt with 'a requirement for the safety of the employees invited into
the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification
of various laws.'" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1244 (1987)
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415). Cf Penn Central,438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the Court has ruled that a
taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby
'secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage.'" (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415)).
A similar economic factor is described in R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTRoLS 136
(1981), as balancing public benefits against private losses. "Courts often deem cost-benefit analysis
of the challenged regulation to be a relevant, perhaps even decisive, factor in takings litigation." Id.
(citing State Dep't of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977)).
220. Cf, eg., Penn Central,438 U.S. at 123 (" 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole' ") (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960)); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981) (including, in a
list of factors to be considered: "Whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capriciously applied"). A
most influential article is Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations of "Just Compensation"Law,80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214-15, 1221-23 (1967) (including a
"utilitarian test" that considers "efficiency gains," "demoralization costs," and "settlement costs,"
and a "fairness test" that asks, "whether a specific decision not to compensate is fair.").
221. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946). Cf Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct.
3141, 3145 (1987) (permanent physical occupation occurs when individuals have permanent and
continuous right to pass over real property).
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unilateralgovernmental action that causes a permanentphysical invasion of private land.
Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TV Corp.222 is the leading case holding that a minor but permanent physical invasion may constitute a taking.
When a permanent physical occupation occurs-for instance, the required cable
television wire across the landlord's building in Loretto-" 'the character of the
government action' not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a taking but is determinative." 223 The Court viewed permanent
physical occupations as "perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an
owner's property interests."'224 The Loretto per se test was premised on the
Court's concern that
an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property.... [P]roperty law has long
protected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed
at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the
owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury

...

[S]uch an occupation is qualitatively more severe

than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes
affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may
have no control
22 5
over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.
Loretto announced a "very narrow" 22 6 holding; it did not alter the "substantial authority upholding a State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his property. '2 27 Drawing the fine line between a
reasonable regulation of use and an unconstitutional appropriation of a public
easement still remains difficult, though, as illustrated in the important
1987
2 28
Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.
A. Nollan and Required Dedications
Nollan considered whether the California Coastal Commission could require landowners to dedicate a lateral public access easement as a condition to
receiving a permit to build a new house.229 The five-member majority said no,
grounding its decision on two theories. First, the Court concluded that the intended public accessway constituted a "permanent physical occupation" within
the Loretto rule,230 yet declined to rule that the Nollan facts required a "per se"
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 441.

227. Id.
228. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
229. The California Coastal Act required the Nollans to obtain a coastal development permit
from the California Coastal Commission. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30106, 30212 & 30600 (West
1986). Although the Nollans were replacing a small bungalow with a new, two-story house, the
greater than 10% increase in the size of the building triggered the permit requirement. Nollan, 107

S. Ct. at 3143-44.
230. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3145. But cf Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 ("More recent cases confirm the
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declaration. 231 Second, recognizing that a land use permit reasonably conditioned on a dedication of land was not necessarily a taking, 232 the Court considered whether the nexus between the regulation and the state interest satisfied the
233
requirement that the regulation "substantially advance" the state interest.
The Court concluded that the Coastal Commission's justification for the access
requirement was insufficiently related to its legitimate coastal regulatory
234
purposes.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that prior Supreme Court
cases had "not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a
legitimate state interest or what type of connection between the regulation and

the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantially advance'
the latter. ' 235 Scalia's important footnote 3 explained:
[O]ur opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as
those applied to due process or equal protection claims.... [T]here is
no reason to believe (and the language of our cases gives some reason
to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the
standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal
protection challenges are identical; any more than there is any reason

to believe that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the standards for due process challenges, equal protection challenges, and First
236
Amendment challenges are identical.

The dissent argued that the Nollan majority subjected the substantial-advancement-of-a-legitimate-state-end question to a surprisingly high degree of ju-

dicial scrutiny: "the Court imposes a standard of precision for the exercise of a
State's police power that has been discredited for the better part of this cendistinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation,
and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property.").
231. The following briefs argued that the Supreme Court should treat the Nollan facts as constituting a "per se" taking under Loretto: Brief for Appellants at 14; Brief for Breezy Point Cooperative, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 16; Brief Amicus Curiae of the California
Association of Realtors in Support of Appellants at 11. The Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Reversal at 9 contains this argument:
[Mie believe that no one factor is determinative of appellants' takings claim. The Coastal
Commission's lateral access dedication requirement is not a per se taking simply because it
implicates a physical invasion of appellants' property.... In our view, a more structured
and determinate inquiry is both possible and appropriate.
Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Reversal, at 9.
232. Cf Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3149 (citing most major subdivision exaction cases favorably, but
specifically excepting the California state court cases).
233. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3146 ("We have long recognized that land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land.' ") (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). "Our
cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement
that the former 'substantially advance' the latter." Id. at 3146-47.
234. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3148 ("In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use
but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion' ") (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H.
581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
235. Id. at 3147.
236. Id. at 3147 n.3.
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tury.' ' 237 In fact, the Supreme Court normally does subject a State's exercise of
238
the police power to a most deferential level of scrutiny.
What, then, triggered Nollan's higher degree of judicial scrutiny? Nollan

did not specifically hold that all fifth amendment takings challenges will receive
heightened scrutiny even if due process or equal protection challenges would
not. 239 The distinctive factor in Nollan most probably was the threat of a per-

manent physical invasion, which thereby raised the spectre of a Loretto-type
taking. 24° Although the Court properly refused to rely entirely on the dedication as a per se taking under Loretto, Nollan is best read as standing for the
proposition that all use regulations purporting to license permanent physical occupations by the public will be subjected to higher judicial scrutiny. 24 1 As a
corollary, Nollan should not be read as holding that all fifth amendment challenges will be subjected to heightened scrutiny, although, as analyzed below,
Justice Scalia may intend this approach.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion implicitly raised, without answering, these
additional questions: Does Nollan signal that the Court will always address the
substantial-relation-to-a-legitimate-end question before engaging in a multifactored balancing process? If so, will the Court subject the substantial-relation question to heightened scrutiny?
Judging from Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell v. City of San Jose,24 2 he
237. Id. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to 8-7 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the rise and fall of the Lochner era).
238. See, eg., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("fairly debatable" test for validity of legislative classifications under substantive due process facial challenge). A
rational basis test is the usual standard of judicial review in equal protection challenges. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) ("The general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest."); see Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239. But cf Supreme Court, 1986 Term, supra note 17, at 247 (Nollan "indicates that all regulations will now be subjected to a level of scrutiny far higher than the Court previously has used in
assessing claims of regulatory takings."). As discussed above, the Loretto-type "permanent physical
occupation" in Nollan may have triggered the Court's higher scrutiny. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at
3145. However, even in a regulatory taking case a government entity with a very loose "Nollan
nexus" will likely not fare well, as Nollan does not explicitly rule out heightened scrutiny in all
takings challenges. Cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242
(1987) (The lower courts "were both convinced that the legislative purposes set forth in the statute
were genuine, substantial, and legitimate and we have no reason to conclude otherwise.").
240. See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
241. The nexus issue in subdivision exaction cases, for example, will probably now receive
stricter scrutiny. State courts have produced wide variations concerning the required nexus between
the lands exacted and the public need. Views have ranged from Illinois' strict Pioneer Trust test, see
Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802
(1961) (burden cast upon subdivider must be "specifically and uniquely attributable to this activity"), through Texas' mid-range Turtle Rock test, see City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.,
680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (rex. 1984) (requiring the "reasonable connection" analysis supported by the
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-103, at 38 (1976)), to California's more liberalAyres
and Associated Home Builders' test, see Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.
3d 633, 640-41, 484 P.2d 606, 611-13, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635-37 (reasonable conditions conforming
to welfare of lot owners and general public upheld), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). It is
instructive to note that the Nollan majority cited Pioneer Trust, Turtle Rock, and numerous other
state cases favorably. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149-50. The Nollan Court's conspicuous exclusion of
"the California state courts," id, is a strong signal that California's liberal nexus test will no longer
be constitutionally acceptable.
242. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
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may prefer that the Court answer the nexus question first and, if there is an
insufficient nexus, declare a taking. In Pennell, Justice Scalia cited Agins v. City
of Tiburon,243 which noted, without holding, that a zoning law effects a taking if
the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests. 2 "4 He
then concluded that the "tenant hardship" provision of the San Jose rent control
statute at issue in Pennell failed to meet theAgins test and "effect[ed] a taking of
property without just compensation. '245 The analysis Justice Scalia proposed in
Pennell resembles his analysis of the nexus issue in Nollan. But the majority in
Pennell concluded that the "substantial relationship" question was "premature,",24 6 presumably because the ordinance was being challenged facially instead of as-applied to a specific landowner.
The "substantial relationship" question under takings analysis resembles
the police power analysis under substantive due process, under which an ordinance is presumed constitutional and is subjected to a narrow scope of judicial
review.247 If a Pennell-type rent control case again reaches the Court-but as a
challenge to the ordinance's constitutionality with respect to a specific landowner as opposed to the facial challenge in Pennell-is the Court likely to find it
an unconstitutional taking without engaging in a multifactored balancing process? If the Court agrees with Justice Scalia that the absence of a sufficient
nexus is determinative of the taking issue, it might. The intriguing question,
though, is whether the Court will apply Nollan-type heightened scrutiny and
require the regulating city to carry the burden of demonstrating that the nexus is
met. To do so, of course, would signal judicial review more akin to the discredited Lochner era24 8-at least for fifth amendment regulatory "takings" of

''property."

Some of the dissenting justices' arguments in Nollan should not have been
dismissed so readily. The arguments raise three factors, in particular, that de243. 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980).
244. Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
245. Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
246. Id. at 856.
247. See supra note 238.
248. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. Lochner involved heightened scrutiny both in
(1) the means to end inquiry and (2) the legitimate ends inquiry. The Court said there were certain
ends, viz. redress of inequality in bargaining power, that government cannot pursue. Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). Nollan overtones of Lochner are principally audible in the means
to end inquiry. By conceding, for example, that assuring visual access to the ocean would be a
legitimate end of the police power, the Scalia opinion does not seem to suffer from the more serious
ends scrutiny of Justice Peckham's Lochner opinion. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONs'rrruTioNAL
LAW 453-58 (11th ed. 1985) (contrasting the two opinions):
Justice Peckham recognized that "health" is a legitimate end of the police power ....
With respect to health, he was not satisfied that the means adequately promoted that legitimate state end. But there was another arguable end of the law... [-]unequal bargaining
position... [and] perceived economic inequalities[-] ... [that were] not within the objectives contemplated by the police power .... It is difficult to perceive a basis for the Lochner majority's view of impermissible ends other than an improper reading of a particular
economic philosophy into the Constitution.
Id. at 456. See also Supreme Court, 1986 Term, supra note 17, at 250 ("Especially troubling is the
Court's assertion that regulations that diminish the value of property rights are subject to a different
and more exacting standard of review under the takings clause than are economic regulations under
the due process or equal protection clauses.").
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serve further analysis: (1) the explanation of why the boundary issue is different
when unique coastal lands are at issue;24 9 (2) the reciprocity of advantage that
accrues from reasonable dedication requirements from all littoral owners; 250 and
(3) the cumulative effect when the totality of probable construction will be unreasonable although each individual's development, considered alone, seems
2 51

innocuous.

The Nollans' beachfront lot lies on the Faria Beach shoreline between the
Pacific Coast Highway and the Pacific Ocean. A public beach and recreation
area is located a quarter of a mile north of the Nollan house, and another public
beach area lies 1,800 feet south. A concrete seawall, which runs behind all the
houses between the two public beach areas, separates the beach area from the
developed part of the Nollan lot. The lateral passageway at issue would, when
coupled with similar ones behind all other houses, have provided a continuous
accessway between the two public beach areas and would have been located
waterward of the seawall and landward of the mean high tide line.
The Faria Beach shoreline "'fluctuates during the year depending on the
seasons and accompanying storms, and the public is not always able to traverse
the shoreline below the mean high tide line.' "252 When this author first tried to
walk on the public's tidelands behind the Nollans' house, a minor rainstorm had
caused the water to lap against the seawall; public passage would have required
walking through the breaking tide. 253 On the next day, though, some dozen or
more feet of beach were uncovered, albeit entirely wet from the seawall to the
water's edge.25 4 No one, including littoral owners, would have any reasonable
means of locating the historic mean high tide line. 255 And because of the ambulatory nature of beaches in general, 256 it would be inappropriate to mark the
boundaries as might be done with ordinary non-migrating lands.
The majority should not have equated boundary dispute problems of ordinary land with the special problems that exist when the coastal boundaries migrate. They should have been more sensitive to the unique property problems
where land and sea meet, as was the Texas Matcha court in the migrating public
249. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3155-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

250. See Id. at 3158 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
251. See id. at 3162 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
252. Id. at 3155 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Appendix volume 1,Nollan, at 67).
253. Author's notes from visit to the area surrounding the Nollan house, October 23, 1987, at
approximately noon.
254. Author's notes from visit to the area surrounding the Nollan house, October 24, 1987, in
mid-afternoon.
255. "The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's oceanside boundary." Nollan, 107 S,
Ct. at 3143. See generally Dinkins, Texas SeashoreBoundaryLaw: The Effect ofNatural andArtilicialModifications,10 Hous. L. REv. 43, 44 (1972) (in Texas, the mean high tide line is based on an
18.6 year average incorporating the highest mark of two daily tides).
256. "Unlike the typical area in which a boundary is delineated reasonably clearly, the very
problem on Faria Beach is that the boundary is not constant." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3156, n.6. See
generallyR. POWELL & J.ROHAN, 5 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 717(1) n.6 (1987) (citations to
cases and other authorities considering accretion and other shoreline boundary problems); Note, The
Federal Rule of Accretion and California Coastal Protection, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1457, 1461-62
(1975) (describing migrating nature of beaches).
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257
easement case.

The Nollan majority also inadequately considered Justice Brennan's analogy of the public access easement to required dedications of sidewalks in front of
private residences. 258 The sidewalk-by-highway analogy is even more instructive when one considers that the boundaries of a navigable "highway" and its
adjacent wet sand "sidewalk" do not remain fixed. The public-trust highway 259
behind the Nollan house is regularly used, and legally so, by surfers and strollers.26° Just as government should provide safe walkways along land highways,
it should provide them along public waterways. Although the public may know
that wet sands are usually public tidelands protected by the public trust doctrine, the inherent migration of coastal boundaries will cause confusion concerning the public's right of passage for both the private landowner and the public.
The public needs a margin of safe passage on the shore, without fear that, because of a shifting mean high tide line, lands previously public are now private.
The majority opinion is also deficient in failing to accept as applicable one
of the major exceptions to the takings guarantee: the Coastal Commission's dedication requirement afforded the Nollans and all other similarly regulated Faria
Beach landowners an "average reciprocity of advantage. 2 6 1 The Nollans,
though burdened by the dedication requirement, received an offsetting benefit
because all their neighbors were similarly burdened. 262 On days when the tide is
close to the seawall, the Nollans and their guests likely trespass, perhaps unintentionally, on neighbors' lands in order to stroll along the shore. Would they
not increase their enjoyment of their own coastal lot if they (and the rest of the
public) were privileged to walk closer to the seawall?
Of course, the Faria Beach landowners probably acquiesce to their neighbors' trespasses. In fact, Faria Beach landowners probably have long acquiesced
to the public strolling seaward of the wall. In a suit to quiet title, adequate
evidence may well exist to prove that the Nollans' land between the seawall and
mean high tide line is subject to an easement under prescriptive easement, im263
plied dedication, or other common-law theory.
As this Article argues above, courts should fashion tests of reasonableness
in nuisance cases that measure each individual's actions against a standard that
considers the impact upon the public if every other landowner, similarly situ257. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
258. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. The public trust doctrine applies to all lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 794 (1988) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894)). The state's public trust doctrine is defined by state law, and California acquired title to
public trust lands upon becoming a state. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d
419, 434, 658 P.2d 709, 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 355 (1983) (citing City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 365, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 330 (1980)).
260. See Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3156-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Use by strollers and surfers was
confirmed in Interview with Dan Ray, California Coastal Commission, in Santa Barbara, Cal. (Oct.
23, 1987).
261. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415; see supra note 219 and accompanying text; Nollan,
107 S. Ct. at 3158 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
262. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3144; id. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 3161 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, eg., supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
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ated, were allowed to proceed as requested. 264 The Nollan majority inade-

quately considered this cumulative impact problem.
The California Coastal Commission found, among other things, that the
Nollans' new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean and would
increase private use of the shorefront. These effects would "cumulatively 'bur-

den the public's ability to traverse to and along the shorefront.' "265 In light of
this finding, Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that "the Court's insistence on
a precise accounting system in this case is insensitive to the fact that increasing
intensity of development in many areas calls for far-sighted, comprehensive
planning that takes into account both the interdependence of land uses and the

cumulative impact of development." 2 66 State agencies will need more flexibility
than Nollan allows if they are to implement
Congressional policies focusing on
267
the overall impact of development.
Perhaps the Nollan litigation could have been avoided by better implemen-

tation of California coastal law. The Nollans' lot is part of a long coastal tract
originally owned by the Faria family. 268 Did the coastal commission, or, at an
earlier time, local government, have an opportunity to secure adequate accessways through the subdivision control process? 269 The ideal time for setting

aside reasonable vertical and lateral accessways is at the subdivision approval
stage. 270 Nollan would not prohibit such reasonable dedications, assuming the
nexus requirement is met, as it undoubtedly could have been with the Faria
264. Tort law addresses cumulative impact issues in a similar manner. See supra notes 181-83
and accompanying text. For an analogous use of the cumulative impact concept in "affecting commerce" cases under the commerce clause, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)
("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power "to excise, as trivial, individual instances" of the class.); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) ("That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) ("competition by a small part may affect the whole and
that the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great").
265. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144 (quoting Joint Appendix volume 1, at 65-66).
266. Id. at 3161-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 3162 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. Interview with Dan Ray, California Coastal Commission, in Santa Barbara, Cal. (Oct. 23,
1987).
269. Subdivision of much of the Faria coastal land "happened from 1973 on," id., which would
have occurred while the California Coastal Commission and its predecessor commission had jurisdiction. California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, 1972 CAL. STATS. A-181 (repealed Jan.
1, 1977); California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986 &
Cum. Supp. 1988). But cf Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143, for implication that subdivision may have
occurred much earlier ("The building on the lot was a small bungalow.... After years of rental use,
however, the building had fallen into disrepair, and could no longer be rented out.").
270. See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEvELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 202-12 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing subdivision controls). As discussed supra
at note 241, Nollan casts substantial doubt on California's previous subdivision exaction cases while
citing favorably a substantial number of cases from other jurisdictions. One cited case, City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984), required a "reasonable connection"
analysis, a position taken in ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-103 at 38 (1976). Turtle
Rock required a consideration of the public "need" for the exaction and the offsetting "benefit" to
the residents of the particular subdivision. 680 S.W.2d at 807. If reasonable exactions of reasonable
accessways had been required when the entire Faria coastal tract was subdivided, the public need
and offsetting benefits to the subdivision residents should have been easily demonstrated.
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tract. 27 1 Although the reciprocity of advantage and cumulative impact aspects
should have received more attention in Nollan, these factors would receive considerable weight, and normally should be determinative, when a larger subdivision is being platted.
Looking to the future, Nollan should not prevent the California Coastal
Commission from promoting the coastal act's access policies through reasonable
vertical and lateral access requirements. True, there must at least be a reasonable fit between the regulatory end furthered and the burden on the landowner. 2 72 The Commission should be able to meet this standard, however, for
many vertical and even lateral accessways, just as governments will undoubtedly
and school
be able to require dedication of streets, sidewalks, and even parks
273
sites where large areas are considered by subdivision permits.
B.

The Public Trust Doctrine and the Taking Issue

Takings disputes at the water's edge often implicate the public trust doctrine, and the 1988 Supreme Court decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Missis274
vividly reaffirmed the doctrine's potential significance. As discussed
sippi
earlier, the public trust doctrine might be the theoretical basis for a public right
in private lands, 275 or it might trigger higher judicial scrutiny and protection of
public rights acquired in some other manner.276 The doctrine is also relevant in
277
resolving some taking disputes.
Does the Nollan majority opinion implicate the public trust doctrine? Justice Blackmun, in dissent, thought not: the parties did not argue the doctrine,
and the California decisions did not rest on it. 278 Clearly the majority in Nollan
did not reach the question whether the public had earlier acquired an easement
in the Nollan lot between the seawall and the mean high tide line.
[T]he commission did not advance this argument in the Court of Appeal, and the Nollans argued in the Superior Court that any claim that
there was a pre-existing public right of access had to be asserted
through a quiet title action.., which the Commission, possessing no
claim to the easement itself, probably would not have had standing
under California law to bring. 279
It was therefore not appropriate for the Commission to argue-as an alternative theory to, say, the implied dedication theory the California Supreme
271. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.

272. Id. at 3148.
273. Cf. id. at 3157 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing authority for upholding reasonable exactions of sidewalks in front of private residences).
274. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
275. See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
277. See infra notes 286-90, 396-414 and accompanying text.
278. "I do not understand the Court's opinion in this case to implicate in any way the publictrust doctrine." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3162 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 738 (West 1980)).
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Court espoused in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz 2 8° -that the public had an ease-

ment under a public trust rationale similar to the one enunciated by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Matthews v. Bay HeadImprovement Association.2 8 1 California's Attorney General presumably could still assert the public's rights in the
disputed Nollan area, arguing in part that the public trust doctrine supports a

public easement. Similarly, it would have been premature for the Commission
to argue that an earlier acquired easement was held in trust for the public-the
2 82
theory a New York Supreme Court adopted in Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach.

Even so, these potential arguments raise two questions which still deserve careful attention. First, what is the relationship of the public trust doctrine to the
taking issue? And second, did the Supreme Court's analytical approach to
resolving the Nollan takings dispute necessarily implicate the public trust doctrine even if the majority made no reference to it?
If a regulated area is within the tidally influenced area subject to the public
trust doctrine, the state, upon admission to statehood, will have fee simple title,

and the taking issue will not arise because there is no private property to be
taken.2 83 If the state has earlier relinquished all the public's equitable trust
rights, then the taking issue may arise, assuming courts will validate the state's
relinquishment of thejus publicum.284 If applicable state law holds that earlier
conveyances into private ownership pass only thejusprivatum and are still subject to thejuspublicum, the private owner may have only a "naked fee" 285 and a
taking most likely will not occur.
Nollan concerned regulation of private land lying landward of the historic
mean high tide line and therefore beyond the area normally subject to the public
280. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
281. 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); see supra notes 122-31 and
accompanying text.
282. 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem., 45 A.D.2d 841, 358
N.Y.S.2d 957, appeal denied, 35 N.Y.2d 644, 324 N.E.2d 370, 364 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1974); see supra
notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
283. The Phillips Petroleum decision reaffirmed that "the States, upon entry into the Union,
received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide." Phillips, 108 S.
Ct. at 795. Phillipsalso recognized that a state's definition of trust purposes can relate to public uses
beyond physical navigation. Id. at 798. But see id. at 800 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for
limitation of public trust to physical navigation and commerce purposes). Additional uses recognized by state law might include "bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral development." Id. at 798. The public trust doctrine will therefore reach not only nonnavigable waters on
the seashore that are affected by the tide, but will also apply to all tide waters connected to the sea,
even, as in Phillips, to nonnavigable waters by a navigable, tidal river.
284. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892). Justice Harlan wrote:
It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation for
wharves, piers, docks and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which,
being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public upon which such lands are
held by the State.
Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
285. See People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 598, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913) ("naked title to
the soil").
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trust doctrine. 286 Takings disputes involving lands lying in close proximity to
public trust lands can still implicate the public trust doctrine, however, as two
wetlands cases illustrate. The first, Justv. Marinette County, 2 87 upheld stringent
regulation of Wisconsin wetlands. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted:
This is not a case of an isolated swamp unrelated to a navigable
lake or stream, the change of which would cause no harm to public
rights. Lands adjacent to or near navigable waters exist in a special
relationship to the state. They... are subject to the state public trust
288
powers.
The second case, Graham v. Estuary Properties,Inc.,289 embraced the Just rationale and reached a similar conclusion. Both Just and Estuary Propertiesrejected the takings challenges and, in doing so, placed major emphasis upon the
proposed development's harm to adjacent lands, particularly to submerged lands
held in trust for the public. Proximity to public trust lands is a relevant takings
290
factor, however, only if courts apply the usual multifactored balancing test.
Nonetheless, the Nollan Court found a taking before the balancing stage; thus
the public trust doctrine was never implicated in Nollan.
In a per se taking analysis, such as the analysis the Court applied to the
unilateral permanent physical invasion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.,29 1 courts find a taking without applying the usual multifactored
analysis. 2 9 2 The Nollans and several amici tried to convince the Court that the
facts required a per se taking determination. 293 The Court declined to treat a
permit condition case as a per se case, however, in part because of the implications of such a decision for reasonable subdivision controls and other reasonable
permit conditions. 294 Nollan can be classified as a physical invasion case. The
Court closely examined the facts because of the physical invasion of the Nollans'
land, then found a taking because the nexus between the burden on the Nollans
and the governmental end was inadequate. 295 Under this explanation, Nollan is
a per se physical invasion case since the nexus that might otherwise validate a
permit condition or subdivision exaction was absent.
An alternative explanation of the Nollan rationale is that Nollan constitutes
a new category of takings cases in which the Court first considers the nexus
question and, if the connection is insufficient, declares a taking without engaging
in a multifactored balancing process. As discussed above, Justice Scalia appears
286. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
287. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); see Bryden, A Phantom Doctrine: The Origins and
Effects of Just v. Marinette County, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 397, 410-12 (administration of fill
permits in Wisconsin and Minnesota rarely drastically reduced value of land; ideology and politics,
not constitutional law, were the major factors limiting severity of conservancy zoning).
288. 56 Wis. 2d at 18-19, 201 N.W.2d at 769 (citations omitted).
289. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
290. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
291. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 231.
294. See supra notes 241, 269 and accompanying text.
295. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145, 3148.
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to be pointing toward this kind of threshold analysis in all takings cases. 296
However one classifies Nollan, the Court declared a constitutional taking without engaging in a multifactored analysis. The public trust doctrine was therefore
not implicated.
Many future coastal access cases may well implicate the public trust doctrine. Nollan did not brand all required dedications for public use as per se
takings. It simply required that such dedications be reasonably related to their
purpose and that, before reaching other takings factors, the regulation must pass
an "essential nexus" test.297 If the regulating authority can prohibit a proposed
use, then it can substitute a condition for the prohibition. 29 8 There must be,
however, a substantive fit between the condition and the original purpose for the
regulation. "In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation
of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' "299 Although the Nollan
exaction did not meet the Court's nexus test, future permit conditions might well
meet it, at which point the Court's takings analysis will require application of
the balancing test, which in turn may implicate the public trust doctrine.
C.

The FederalNavigationalServitude and the Taking Issue

The navigational servitude, stemming from the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution, 30° expresses "the notion that the determination
whether a taking has occurred must take into consideration the important public
interest in the flow of interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact
capable of supporting public navigation. '30 1 Its purpose is to assure that navigable waters continue "to serve as continuous highways for the purpose of navi'30 2
gation in interstate commerce."
If Congress in a proper exercise of the navigation power burdens expectations arising from private property ownership, compensation may not be required constitutionally to the extent the burdened expectations were subject to
the navigational servitude. 30 3 The affected landowner's title never included
296. See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
297. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
298. Id. at 3147.
299. Id. at 3148 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12,
14 (1981)).
300. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, c1.3.

301. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
302. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 177; United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 50709 (1945); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 71-72 (1913); Morreale,
FederalPowerin Western Waters The Navigation Powerand the Rule ofNo Compensation, 3 NAT.
REsOURc ES J.1, 19 (1963); see also Comment, Navigation Servitude-The Shifting Rule ofNo Com.
pensation, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 501, 509 (1972) (discussing history of servitude and effect of
1970 amendment to 33 U.S.C. § 595a concerning locational values); Note, The NavigationServitude:
Post Kaiser-Aetna Confusion, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 445, 445 (1986) (tracing history of servitude and
concluding that although KaiserAetna was an attempt to limit the doctrine, it only increased the
confusion); Note, RecreationalRights in Public Water Overlying PrivateProperty, 8 VT. L. REV. 301,
328 (1983) (discussing KaiserAetna in relation to Vermont law); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94
HARV. L. REv. 205, 207 (1980) (critical analysis of KaiserAetna).
303. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
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those interests reserved under the superior navigational servitude; therefore,
"property" has not been "taken" in the constitutional sense.
30 5
United States v. Cress3 °4 and United States v. Willow River Power Co.
illustrate the difficulties of determining whether the navigational servitude applies. In each case, the asserted property interest was the advantage of having
water fall a particular distance at a particular rate of speed. When the government's improvements in a navigable waterway caused the level of water to rise,
the head of water decreased, and landowners asserted a compensable taking.
In Cress the Supreme Court found a compensable taking because the head
of water was created by water falling into a nonnavigable tributary, the water
level of which had risen when the governmental authority improved the navigable waterway. 30 6 Although the facts closely resembled those in Cress, the
Supreme Court in Willow River distinguished Cress by finding that the water did
not fall into a nonnavigable tributary but rather into a navigable waterway subject to the dominant navigational servitude. 30 7 The Court noted "'[tihe owner
of the bank has no jus privatum, or special usufructary interest, in the
water.' ",308 The owner's interest was simply "a privilege or a convenience, enjoyed for many years, permissible so long as compatible with navigation interests, but it is not an interest protected by law when it becomes inconsistent with
'30 9
plans authorized by Congress for improvement of navigation.
The navigational servitude is well established in American jurisprudence. 3 10 Tidal and submerged lands had special status in the English common
law as well as in earlier legal systems.3 11 In 1894 the Supreme Court explained
in Shively v. Bowlby3 12 that the King of England had a primafacie right to the
shore between the ordinary high water and low water mark.3 13 Indeedi the
King had "both the title and dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the
304. 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
305. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
306. Cress, 243 U.S. at 329-30.
307. Willow River, 324 U.S. at 506-07. But cf.id. at 513 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) ("the Government's answer admitted averments of the petition that the dam and power plant were located near a
point where the [nonnavigable] Willow River discharges in the [navigable] St. Croix River").
308. Id. at 507 (quoting I J.LEWIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 118 (3d ed.
1909)).
309. Id. at 509. A defensible argument can be advanced that the Court in Willow River irapliedly overruled Cress. The Court seemingly glossed over the fact that the water in Willow River
also fell directly into a nonnavigable stream (albeit very close to a navigable waterway) because the
Court concluded that the policy underlying Cress was unsound.
310. E.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967);
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956); Willow River, 324 U.S. at 509;
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 63 (1913); Scranton v. Wheeler,
179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
311. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 794 (1988); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1891). But cf. MacGrady,
The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, CurrentImportance, and Some Doctrines That Don'tHold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. Rnv. 513, 609 (1975) (extensive
historical analysis illustrates how "[i]nvention, misconception, and treatise writing" contributed to
doctrinal development).
312. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
313. Id. at 12.
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sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high water mark,
within the jurisdiction of the Crown of England. '3 14 These waters and the lands
covered by them were considered public in nature. Although the title, jus
privatum, was in the King, "the dominion thereof,juspublicum, [was] vested in
him as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit."' 315 Thejus
publicum included uses "for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic
'3 16
and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the King's subjects."
Although the King might grant such waters and wetlands to an individual, "this
title,jusprivatum, whether in the King or in a subject, [was] held subject to the
public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing."' 317 The Court in Shively
concluded: "The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil
below high water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws of the several States,
subject to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution. '318 Thus,
in the United States thejuspublicum is subject to state trusteeship 3 19 except in
fields such as interstate navigation which are subject to a supreme, but often
320
concurrent, federal trusteeship.
The federal navigational servitude and public trust doctrine are both
321
grounded in this conceptual split between thejusprivatum andjuspublicum.
Indeed, American jurisprudence requires both doctrines because of the nature of
our federal system. With a single government, as in England, all the jus publicum would be encompassed by the public trust doctrine, without need for a
separate "navigational servitude."
One of the more important navigational servitude and takings cases is the
Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.32 2 Kaiser
Aetna dredged and developed a marina in Kuapa Pond, a "fishpond" having a
314. Id. at 11.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 13.
318. Id. at 57-58.
319. For the common-law doctrine, see, eg., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435
(1892); Colberg, Inc. v. State ex reL Dep't of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416-17, 432 P.2d 3, 8-9,
62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968); Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795,
798-99 (Fla. 1957).
For provisions giving constitutional status to the trust doctrine, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X,
§ 5; FLA. CONSr. of 1968 art. X, § 11. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S.
Ct. 791 (1988) (summarizing and reaffining nineteenth-century cases); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1 (1894) (principal nineteenth-century case tracing the evolution and acceptance in the United

States).
320. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57 ("Upon the American Revolution, [public trust] rights.., were
vested in the original States within their respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the
Constitution to the United States."); accord PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 796 ("[L]ands under
navigable freshwater lakes and rivers were within the public trust given the new States upon their
entry into the Union, subject to the federal navigation easement and the power of Congress to control navigation on these streams under the Commerce Clause.").
321. Cf. Shively, 152 U.S. at 13 (discussingjusprivatumandjuspublicum); S. MOORE, HISTORY
OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 533 (1888) (discussingjus publicum); J.
PHEAR, RIGHTS OF WATER 44-46 (1859) (discussingjuspublicum).

322. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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unique legal status in Hawaii law.323 The Army Corps of Engineers did not
assert its jurisdiction when Kaiser Aetna first dredged the pond and built retaining walls and bridges. The Corps even acquiesced when, in 1961, it was advised
of additional improvements to the marina waters, including construction of a
channel that would allow boats ingress and egress from the bay. The first dispute between Kaiser Aetna and the Corps arose in 1972 when the Corps required a permit for future construction, filling, and excavation in the marina and
prohibited Kaiser Aetna from denying public access to marina waters. The
Corps asserted that the pond had become a "navigable water" as a result of the
3 24
improvements.
The ensuing litigation raised three major issues: (1) Were activities affecting Kuapa Pond subject to federal regulatory jurisdiction? (2) If so, were the
activities in Kuapa Pond subject also to the federal navigational servitude? (3) If
the activities were subject to federal regulatory jurisdiction but were not subject
of public acto the federal navigational servitude, was the Corps' requirement
cess to the marina waters an unconstitutional taking?3 25 The Supreme Court
and lower courts all agreed that Kuapa Pond was a navigable water subject to
federal regulatory jurisdiction, although they differed on the applicable theory of
navigability. 326 The greatest dispute among the parties and, indeed, among the
323. Id. at 167; see HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 6; Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 95, 31 Stat. 141
(reprintedin 1 Aw. REv. STAT. 36 (1985)).
324. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167-69. For a discussion of the term "navigable waters of the
United States" under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, see generally Finnell, The FederalRegulatory Role in CoastalLand Management, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 169, 179-89.
A quasi-estoppel aspect of Kaiser Aetna arguably limits the case's precedential value. The
Army Corps of Engineers let Kaiser Aetna build for a while before asserting regulatory jurisdiction.
KaiserAetna nevertheless remains a significant takings and federal navigational servitude case, particularly when considered in conjunction with Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979). See
infra note 378 and accompanying text.
325. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 169; see U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation").
326. The district court, applying the traditional tests of "navigability in fact," see, eg., The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870), "navigable capacity," see, ag., United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940), and "ebb and flow of the tide," see, eg.,
The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 441, 463-64 (1847); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 606, 610 (3d Cir.
1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975), concluded that, prior to Kaiser Aetna's alterations, Kuapa
Pond was not "navigable in fact" because there was "no evidence that the barrier beach and the
pond's stone walls ever admitted the possibility of even the shallowest boats floating directly from
Kuapa Pond to the open bay." United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D. Haw. 1976).
The court also thought evidence was lacking to establish jurisdiction under the "navigable capacity"
test. Id. at 49-50. The district court rested its jurisdictional conclusion on the "ebb and flow" test,
id. at 50, applying the rationale of Stoeco Homes.
The Ninth Circuit concluded, for different reasons, that Kuapa Pond was navigable. It accepted, arguendo, Kaiser Aetna's contention that the pond in its natural state was not navigable
within the meaning of the ebb and flow test because "that test determines the outer limits of an
admittedly navigable water body and does not serve to render navigable a separate and distinct water
body not otherwise navigable." United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 381 n.2 (9th Cir.
1978). Rather, the court rested its jurisdictional conclusion on the DanielBall test as elaborated by
the Appalachian Power "navigable capacity test," namely "whether the water 'has "capability of use
by the public for the purpose of transportation and commerce."' " Id. at 382 (quotingAppalachian
Power, 311 U.S. at 410 (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874))).
All members of the Supreme Court, in the Court's six-to-three decision, agreed the fishpond was
subject to federal jurisdiction. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion grounded its conclusion on
traditional tests as enunciated in The Daniel Ball and Appalachian Power, emphasizing that Appa-
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Supreme Court Justices and lower court judges, was whether the navigational

servitude extends to all navigable waters subject to regulation under the Rivers
and Harbor Act of 1899.327 This question was critical because of the takings

challenge: if the federal navigational servitude attached to all navigable waters
as defined within the Rivers and Harbors Act, then no taking could occur be-

cause Kuapa Pond would be subject to the navigational servitude. The Supreme
Court held that "navigable waters" and the navigational servitude are not coex-

tensive;3 2 8 the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the alterations that resulted in
federal jurisdiction subjected Kuapa Pond to the federal navigational servitude. 329 The Court accepted the reasoning of the district court: the naviga-

tional servitude applies to "interstate waters that in theirnaturalcondition are in
fact capable of supportingpublic navigation. ' 33 0 Waters such as Kuapa Pond

which are made navigable because of private investment are not subject to the
331
navigational servitude.
The final dispute in KaiserAetna was whether the Corps' public access condition constituted a taking. The majority noted that Congress had power under
3 32
the commerce clause to assure the public a free right of access to the marina.
The opinion furtheremphasized that "[w]hether a statute or regulation that
'3 3
went so far amounted to a 'taking,' however, is an entirely separate question."
Since the Court held that regulation by the Corps in Hawaii Kai Marina did not

enjoy the immunity of the navigational servitude, Corps regulations were subject
to traditional takings analysis. The Court concluded that "the Government's
attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a
taking." 33 4

lachianPower indicates that "congressional authority over the waters of this Nation does not depend
on a stream's 'navigability.'" Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174. The Court's decisions in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), Justice Rehnquist added, demonstrate that "a wide spectrum of economic activities 'affect' interstate commerce and thus are susceptible of congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, indeed, water, is involved." KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 174. In dissent, Justice Blackmun concluded that federal jurisdiction rested, in premarina days, on the "ebb and flow" test and, in postmarina days, also on the
"navigable-in-fact" test. Id. at 181-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For reasons similar to the district
court's, Justice Blackmun would "stop short of agreeing with the Government's contention that the
pond has been shown to be navigable under the AppalachianPower test." Id. at 184 n.3. (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
327. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1982)).
328. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 172 ("[Tlhis Court has never held that the navigational servitude
creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause
authority to promote navigation.").
329. Id. at 165-66.
330. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
331. Id. at 179-80; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988). In Phillips
Petroleum, the Court rejected a similar contention, asserted by Justice O'Connor in dissent, that the
public trust doctrine applies only to physically navigable waters. See id. at 803 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
332. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 178 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). Among Justice
Holmes' famous phrases in Pennsylvania Coal is, "The general rule at least is, that while property
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The Court noted that private effort and investment "can lead to the fruition
of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for
before it takes over the management of the land-owner's property." 335 The
"right to exclude," 33 6 the Court held, fell within this category of expectancies.
The Corps' public access requirement was not a case of "insubstantial devaluation," but was one that would "result in an actual physical invasion of the pri' 337
vately owned marina."
KaiserAetna prefigured the per se taking result of Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.338 Nevertheless, KaiserAetna is a highly questionable
takings case when viewed in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions discussed below. 339 KaiserAetna held that the right to exclude is a "fundamental
element" of property.34° Within a year, however, the Court explained in
PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins 34 1 that the right to exclude is relative, not
342
absolute.
KaiserAetna concluded that the Corps' public access requirement was constitutionally impermissible because it "result[ed] in an actual physical invasion
of the privately owned marina" and the devaluation of Kaiser Aetna's private
property would not be "insubstantial. ' 343 Kaiser Aetna-type physical invasion
will now undoubtedly trigger the heightened takings scrutiny of Nollan v. Calimay be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
335. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
336. Id. at 179-80.
337. Id. at 180.
338. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text. The Loretto court
held that a minor but permanent physical invasion-a cable installation on the roof and side of a
building-constituted a per se taking. Tracing many older cases, the Court stated, "When faced
with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has
invariably found a taking." Id. at 427. Loretto distinguished Kaiser Aetna in this manner:
"Although the easement of passage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not considered a
taking per se, Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an
unusually serious character." Id. at 433. Nevertheless, Loretto quotes this telling explanation from
KaiserAetna: "'the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina... And even if the Government physically invades
only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay compensation."' Id. at 433 (quoting Kaiser
Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180); see also supra notes 229-41 and accompanying text (discussing Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987), and the similar question of how the Court
characterized a lateral accessway).
339. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
340. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
341. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
342. The Court stated:
It is true that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to
exclude others. And here there has literally been a "taking" of that right .... But it is
well established that "not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action
has been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."
Id. at 82 (citations omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
343. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
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fornia Coastal Commission.344 However, KaiserAetna-type facts do not merit a
per se takings determination for the same reasons that the Nollan facts did not
merit one.345 First, a court should ask whether the Nollan nexus test is met. If
the "fit" between the private burden and the governmental goal346is adequate, the
court should then apply the multifactored balancing analysis.
A Kaiser Aetna-type takings challenge should not be heard at all until the

case is "ripe."' 34 7 The KaiserAetna case was not ripe because a per se determi-

nation was inappropriate and, unlike Nollan, there was a proper nexus in Kaiser
Aetna between the Corps' public access requirement and the governmental end it
furthered. 348 Therefore, the Kaiser Aetna Court should have applied the usual
multifactored balancing test. The determinative factor under this test, besides
physical invasion, was economic impact. 349 The KaiserAetna record, however,
was insufficient to support a determination on economic impact. The Court thus
erred in resting its takings determination in part on a 3finding
that the resultant
50
diminution in property value was "not insubstantial.
Takings jurisprudence does not focus on one discrete part of property and
apply a takings analysis only to that part. The Supreme Court in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City351 did not focus only on the airspace above
Grand Central Station. Even if the landowners were denied all development
approval in that airspace, the Court would still consider the entire parcel on
which Grand Central Station was located as well as Penn Central's holdings
35 2
adjacent to Grand Central in determining whether a taking had occurred.
Upon consideration of Penn Central's total quantum of property, the Court held
35 3 Simithat New York's historic preservation law did not constitute a taking.
344. 107. S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
345. Id. at 3145 n.1; see also Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 82-83 (1979) (although the "right to exclude
others" had been literally "taken," not every destruction or injury constitutes an unconstitutional
taking; rather, multifactored analysis was required, and the California constitutional protection of
free expression in private shopping centers outweighed temporary physical occupations).

346. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148-49; see also supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text (discussing balancing factors applied by the Court).
347. See, eg., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
186 (1985); see also Note, Ripenessfor the Taking Clause: Finality and Exhaustion in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 625
(1986) (examining Williamson County in light of prior takings cases, ripeness, and exhaustion of

administrative remedies); cf.Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S.Ct. 849, 856 (1988) ("premature" to
consider rent control ordinance on present record).

348. Cf KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Government's interest
in vindicating a public right of access to the pond is substantial."). The Corps' access refinement
directly furthered this end.

349. See id. at 180. The Court stated:
This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner
that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the
imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical
invasion of the privately owned marina.
Id.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 131.
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larly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,354 the Court did
not look only at the "right of support" or at the specific coal that was required to
remain in place. Rather, the Court considered the support estate and mineral
estate together and considered all the potentially removable coal. 355 In view of
these larger quantums of property, the Court held that the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act requirement that substantial amounts of coal be left in place to provide surface support did not constitute a taking.35 6 Justice Brandeis' eloquent
dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3 57 in which he argued consideration
358
of the total quantum of property, is now conventional takings jurisprudence.
Justice Rehnquist's KaiserAetna opinion was therefore deficient in focusing exclusively on the marina without considering the large development surrounding
the marina that had undoubtedly benefited greatly from its waterfront location
and governmentally licensed access to the sea.
In short, the KaiserAetna majority opinion on the taking issue is flawed in
at least three respects. First, it incorrectly treated the Corps' access requirement
as a per se taking. Second, the record on economic impact was not ripe for a
multifactored takings analysis. And third, even if the record was ripe, the Court
did not consider the total quantum of Kaiser Aetna's property-its total "invest'359
ment-backed expectations.
Even if the case had been deemed ripe for a takings analysis, the majority
reasoned from an erroneous premise concerning the diminution in value. The
Court treated the marina's fair market value as relevant. 36° A large portion of
the marina's fair market value, however, was attributable to the marina's location adjacent to navigable Maunalua Bay, 3 6 1 which gave the marina owners
ability to enter into and return from the bay. The Court should not have included this portion of the fair market value in the base from which it computed
the extent of diminution. Substantial Supreme Court authority prior to Kaiser
Aetna refused to consider these public values as part of theprivate value of ripa354. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
355. Id. at 1250.

356. Id.
357. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
358. Justice Brandeis wrote:
It is said that one fact for consideration in determining whether the limits of the police
power have been exceeded is the extent of the resulting diminution in value; and that here
the restriction destroys existing rights of property and contract. But values are relative. If
we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare
it with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone,
but with the value of the whole property.
Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Keystone, 107 S.Ct. at 1250; Penn Central,438 U.S. at 13031.
Another part of Justice Brandeis' Pennsylvania Coal dissent is now a well accepted part of
takings jurisprudence: "He may not so use it as to create a public nuisance ....The restriction here
in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use." PennsylvaniaCoal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis
J., dissenting).
359. See sources cited supra note 217.
360. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 177-78.
361. Id. at 190 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
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fian or littoral private property. 362 The extent of diminution in Kaiser Aetna
consequently was calculated from an inflated base; if properly calculated, Kaiser
Aetna's loss of expectation may have been relatively insubstantial, or at least not
so substantial as to be constitutionally impermissible.
True, Congress amended the Rivers and Harbors Act in 1970 to require
that "in all condemnation proceedings ... fair market value [shall be] based
upon all uses to which such real property may reasonably be put, including its
highest and best use, any of which uses may be dependent upon access to or
utilization of such navigable waters."' 363 However, assuming, arguendo, that
this provision applies in a regulatory taking context, a takings challenge is still
not ripe until the trial court has made findings concerning the extent of diminution. Further, the "property" to be considered under this provision does not
include only the marina; Kaiser Aetna's entire holdings surrounding the marina
would also be part of the property from which the Court computes the extent of
diminution.
In the future, the Army Corps of Engineers ought to "condition[ ] permission for connection with other waterways on a right of free public access," as the
dissenting opinion in KaiserAetna suggested. 364 Private landowners will almost
certainly challenge this practice because of Nollan as well as dictum in the Kaiser Aetna majority opinion. 365 Even so, courts applying a future takings analysis
should at least give closer scrutiny to the correct extent of diminution. The
diminution resulting from a permit condition requiring public accessways
should be measured from a base that includes only those values attributable to
thejusprivatum and not to those values, such as the value of access to navigable
waters, that are properly attributable to thejuspublicum. Congress' intention in
drafting the 1970 amendment to the Rivers and Harbors Act,36 6 expressly applicable to condemnation proceedings, undoubtedly was not to extinguish thejus
publicum.367 Hence, the riparian or littoral landowner's private property should
not include these values when diminution is being calculated for takings clause
purposes.
A Corps requirement of dedication of public access as a condition to issuance of an excavation and fill permit should fare better under today's takings
jurisprudence. Courts should employ a Nollan analysis 368 rather than the per se
Loretto -type analysis 369 which KaiserAetna seems to have employed. Since the
Corps can show a proper nexus between the burden on private landowners and
362. See, ag., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1967); United States v. Commodore
Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1945); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 160 (1900). But cf.
Comment, supra note 302, at 512-13 (arguing that the 1970 amendment to 33 U.S.C. § 595a overrules Rands).
363. Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 111, 84 Stat. 1818, 1821 (1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1982)).

364. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 180.
366. See supra note 363.
367. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing when the jus publicum can be
extinguished).
368. See supra notes 230-41 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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the advancement of a public goal, the physical invasion aspect becomes just one
among several factors for the court to consider. The courts should now regard
the quantum of Kaiser Aetna's property370 as greater than the discrete marina
to which the Corps sought to provide public access; it should also include the
surrounding homesites which are so clearly benefited by marina dredging and
access to and from the surrounding navigable bay. Since the Court will apply a
multifactored balancing test-and only when the case is ripe on such issues as
the economic impact from the regulation-a reasonable public access requirement now seems much more likely to pass constitutional muster than in the days
of Kaiser Aetna.
Finally, KaiserAetna's restriction of the navigational servitude to naturally
navigable waters 37 1 should be compared with the 1988 decision in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Mississippi,372 which holds that lands subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide are subject to the public trust doctrine. 373 The fishpond in KaiserAetna
had long been subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, 3 7 4 yet Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion refused to subject the pond to the federal navigational servitude. 375 The KaiserAetna Court concluded that Kuapa Pond was not subject to
the navigational servitude because it became physically navigable only as a result
37 6
of Kaiser Aetna's improvements; it was not navigable in its natural state.
PhillipsPetroleum, however, held that physical navigability is not the sole criterion for the public trust doctrine; all tidally affected lands are subject to the
doctrine. 377 The result in Kaiser Aetna was probably controlled by the treatment of Hawaii fishponds as "private property," a characterization that the
United States accepted in the Treaty admitting Hawaii to the Union. Kaiser
Aetna should therefore be narrowly construed. Most waterfront development
will not occur in such a unique situation. Assume, for example, facts similar to
KaiserAetna in an area not physically navigable in its natural state but made so
only through private effort.378 Assume further that the area is subject to the ebb
370. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1250 (1987); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); supra notes 351-58 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
372. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
373. Id. at 795.
374. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 166.
375. Id. at 172-73.
376. Id. at 178-79; see supra text accompanying notes 323-24.
377. PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. 795.
378. Cf. Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979) (per curiam) (system of manmade
canals subject to tidal fluctuations and navigable in fact). One issue in Vaughn was "whether channels built on private property and with private funds, in such a manner that they ultimately join with
other navigable waterways, are... open to use by all citizens of the United States." Id. at 208. The
Court held that Kaiser Aetna controlled and that "no general right of use in the public arose by
reason of the authority over navigation." Id. at 209. The Court separated a different issue:
[I]f a private citizen on his privately held real property and with private funds creates a
system of artificial navigable waterways, in part by means of diversion or destruction of a
pre-existing natural navigable waterway, does the artificially developed waterway system

become part of the "navigable waterways of the United States" and subject to the use of all
citizens of the United States?
Id. at 208 (emphasis added). The Court noted that KaiserAetna and the principal cases on which it
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and flow of the tide and that nothing in state law treats the area as private

property. These facts are much more common than the peculiarities of the Hawaii fishpond in Kaiser Aetna and, when these facts arise, the state can stringently regulate the area subject to the public trust doctrine without raising any
takings problem. The Corps of Engineers accordingly can condition a permit
upon reasonable public access. Its rationale would not be the federal navigational servitude; by definition, the servitude would not apply.379 Rather, the

rationale would be that the tidally affected area is subject to the public trust
doctrine 380 and that nothing has been taken because the public's access rights
were part of the jus publicum.
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A literal reading of Phillips Petroleum in combination with Kaiser Aetna
leaves maximum power in the states. The extent of this power is clarified by the
holding in PhillipsPetroleum that all lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide
are within the state's public trust doctrine. 381 It is arguable that the only part of

the historicaljuspublicumunder federal trusteeship is the superior navigational
382
servitude imposed by the commerce clause.

Kaiser Aetna rejected the contention that the navigational servitude was
relied did not deal with this specific fact situation; accordingly, the Court remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with Kaiser Aetna.
PhillipsPetroleum held that lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide at the time of statehood
are subject to the public trust doctrine, unless they were earlier transferred free of the trust. Phillips,
108 S.Ct. at 795, 799. An area not physically navigable in its natural state but made so through
private effort should be subject to the public trust doctrine under PhillipsPetroleum, but outside the
reach of the federal navigational servitude under Kaiser Aetna and Vaughn v. Vermilion.
379. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172-73; see supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
380. PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 795.
381. Id.
382. Phillips Petroleum reemphasized the breadth of power given the states under the public
trust doctrine by citing the cases which originally recognized this power.
"At common law, the title and dominion in lands flowed by the tide water were in the
King for the benefit of the nation .... Upon the American Revolution, these rights,
charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within their respective borders
PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,57 (1894)). The Phillips
Petroleum Court also recognized that
[i]t is the settled rule of law in this court that absolute property in, and dominion and
sovereignty over, the soils under the tide waters in the original States were reserved to the
several States, and that the new States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and
jurisdiction ....
PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794 (quoting Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183
(1891)). The individual states are also given the authority to define the limits of the land held in
public trust and to recognize private rights in these lands. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 794
(citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26). In Phillips Petroleum the court "reaffirm[ed] [its] longstanding
precedents which held that the States, upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands
under water subject to the ebb and flow of the tide." PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 795.
But these state powers are not unlimited. Shively made very clear that the trustee responsibilities and powers of the states are "subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United
States." Shively, 152 U.S. at 57. The public trust lands under navigable freshwater lakes and rivers
are also "subject to the federal navigation easement and the power of Congress to control navigation
on those streams under the Commerce Clause." PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 796 (citing Barney
v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877)); see also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892)
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coterminous with federal regulatory power; 383 it restricted the servitude to naturally navigable waters. 384 On the other hand, Phillips Petroleum rejected the
contention, accepted by the dissenters, that the public trust doctrine applied
only to physically navigable waters; it reaffirmed states' rights to define the pub385
lic trust doctrine most expansively.

The public trust doctrine and federal navigational servitude have overtones,
in part, of property concepts. 386 They are also, to a substantial degree, represen-

tations of sovereign power. 38 7 KaiserAetna and Phillips Petroleum, in tandem,
constitute a victory for state sovereign power to protect thejuspublicum-the

public's equitable interests in navigation, commerce, fishing, recreation, ecological values, oil and gas rights, and anything else protected by a particular state's
388
public trust doctrine.
The public trust doctrine should become the theoretical foundation for as-

suring reasonable public access to coastal public property. It should become a

principal theory supporting public rights of access to public property, 389 for protecting public rights already perfected under other common-law theories, 390 and
a key factor for courts to weigh when applying the multifactored takings
391
analysis.

Government can currently require dedications of reasonable accessways,
without compensation, as a condition to issuance of coastal development permis(state power "subject always to the paramount rights of Congress to control their navigation so far
as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce").
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution also presents a very real power retained
by the federal government that could be used, if necessary, to preempt state regulation, including,
presumably, state exercise of state sovereign trustee powers in its public trust lands. See U.S. CONST.
art. VII. Yet, reading PhillipsPetroleum in conjunction with KaiserAetna shows that the states do
now wield maximum power in public trust lands. The federal navigational servitude and Congress'
authority to control navigation are the major powers that the federal government has heretofore
used in the public trust area. The restriction of the navigational servitude to only "naturally navigable" waters in KaiserAetna coupled with the broad power of the states recognized in PhillipsPetroleum leaves little trustee responsibility and power in the federal government.
383. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 172-73.
384. Id.
385. PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 798-99.
386. In Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984), the
Supreme Court said that the public trust doctrine was barred because of the failure on the part of
California officials to assert it in a prior patent proceeding: "The interest claimed by California is
one of such substantial magnitude that regardless.of the fact that the claim is asserted by the State in
its sovereign capacity, this interest.., must have been presented in the patent proceeding or be
barred." .Id. at 209.
387. Cf. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892) ("The trust with which they
are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot be alienated, except in those instances mentioned of
parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.").
388. Cf. PhillipsPetroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 798.
389. See supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 30, at 162
(recommending "expansion of the public trust doctrine by the North Carolina courts as the best
judicial method to provide public beach access in North Carolina").
390. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 214-20, 274-99 and accompanying text.
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sion. The exaction must first pass the Nollan "nexus" test,392 but once the No!lan hurdle is cleared, the exaction will be tested by the normal multifactored
analysis.

39 3

The effect of the regulation on public rights protected by the public trust
doctrine should be an important factor in coastal regulatory cases. This Article
suggests that Nollan's heightened scrutiny, although currently applicable to regulations that raise the specter of a Loretto's-type permanent physical invasion,394 should not apply to all takings cases. Even in an exaction, such as in
Nollan, which threatens permanent physical occupation by the public, after the
court requires the government to demonstrate that the exaction substantially
advances a legitimate state purpose, the takings analysis should proceed with a
presumption of constitutionality and a deferential level of judicial review. 395
Whatever scope of judicial review the courts apply, the public's rights
under the public trust doctrine should receive considerable weight at the multifactored balancing stage. Courts should recognize that proximity of regulated
lands to public trust lands will be relevant to all the traditional takings factors.
In analyzing the "character of the government action,"'396 for example, courts
should be aware of the government's sovereign duties under the public trust
doctrine.
"Whether the regulation 'substantially advances legitimate state interests,' "397 is arguably an independent factor not subject to balancing. Most
courts, however, probably consider this factor at the balancing stage. For example, courts probably differentiate protecting children's safety from protecting
purely aesthetic values. 398 If courts weigh this factor in the balancing analysis,
they should give considerable weight to the regulation's protection of the jus
399

publicum.

Just v. Marinette County4°° and Graham v. Estuary Properties40 1 illustrate
the relevance of the public trust doctrine when the state regulates lands adjacent
to trust lands. Those courts rejected the private landowners' takings challenges,
in part, to prevent harm to public rights. Public nuisance and purpresture law
prohibit certain harms to public interests, and regulations that prevent harms
that would otherwise constitute public nuisances and purprestures should not
constitute takings because of the importance of the harm prevention factor in
392. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3146-48 (1987); see supra notes
233-34 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 239-48 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
396. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); supra note
214 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
398. For another view of the relationship of the governmental end served to the taking issue, see
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 264 (1973) (concluding that if the
public purpose is sufficiently strong the balancing test may not be applied).
399. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
400. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 210 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
401. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); see supranotes 287-89 and accompanying text.
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takings jurisprudence. 4 ° 2 Although these doctrines are limited by the difficulties
in proving causation, courts can apply a standard of reasonable conduct that
4 3
includes consideration of the foreseeable activities of others similarly situated. 0
Even if the proposed activity of a regulated individual, viewed alone, seems innocuous, the activity may pose the kind of public harm that can be prohibited
without compensation when viewed alongside the cumulative activities of others.
The public trust doctrine is also directly relevant to economic impact factors. In determining "distinct investment-backed expectations," 4° 4 for example,
the court should consider the reasonableness of the expectations of purchasers of
coastal land. Coastal lands are unique, and common-law principles from ancient
times to the present reflect these unique qualities through, inter alia, migrating
boundary principles,4° 5 the public trust doctrine, 4 0 6 and the federal navigational
servitude. 4 0 7 In calculating diminution in value,4° 8 which is often a principal
factor, courts must carefully account for public values that are not included in
the private owner's "property" for purposes of the fifth amendment takings
clause. This Article criticizes Kaiser Aetna for failing to segregate particular
noncompensable locational expectations. 409 The public's rights-the jus publicum-should not be included in the private owner's compensable "property";
these are public rights protected by the public trust doctrine and the federal
navigational servitude.
Reasonable coastal access exactions secure an "average reciprocity of advantage,"'4 10 one of the "exceptions" to the "taking guarantee" identified by Jus4 12
tice Rehnquist. 4 11 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
Justice Stevens showed how average reciprocity and a second exception, the
"nuisance exception,"'4 13 relate. 4 14 Each person burdened by a harm-prevention
regulation is also reciprocally benefited because similarly situated neighbors are
also burdened. The lesson for coastal regulation is obvious: coastal landowners
may be burdened by reasonable public access exactions; nevertheless, they are
reciprocally benefited, both as individual landowners and as beneficiaries of the
jus publicum.
This Article recommends that government regulators continue to promote
reasonable public access to public property, including exactions of reasonable
vertical and lateral accessways as conditions to granting coastal development
402. See supra notes 150-83 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 181 -83 and accompanying text.

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 300-20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 357-67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist J.,

dissenting).

412. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
413. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
414. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1245.
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approval. True, the prospect of FirstEnglish "temporary damages" 4 15 is intimidating, especially because, in Justice Stevens' words, "[e]ven the wisest lawyers
would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's
takings jurisprudence. '4 16 The Nollan nexus requirement is not insurmountable, however, and, in many cases, the public may have already acquired an ease4 17
ment under one of the common-law theories discussed earlier in this Article.
Prescription and implied dedication will continue to be useful in establishing public rights in private coastal lands, but, as discussed above, each doctrine
has significant shortcomings. 4 18 Future judicial attention may, and arguably
should, focus more on the applicability of the public trust doctrine and the ancient doctrine of custom. 4 19 At a time when Nollan and First English may discourage government regulators from promoting public access through
regulation, it is particularly important for courts and advocates of the public
interest to establish and protect accessways to public property under all available common-law theories.

415. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987); see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
416. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
417. See supra notes 28-147 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 28-147 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 92-147 and accompanying text.

